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CONCLUSION
This article covers cases from 374 S.W.3d through 404 S.W.3d and federal
cases during the same period that the authors believe are noteworthy to the
jurisprudence on the applicable subject.
I. INTRODUCTION
This survey period continues with trends established during prior periods.
Tax liens and foreclosure challenges dominate the secured real property arena,
with cases based on “robo signing” now appearing. Attacks on residential
foreclosures were plentiful, and the authors have selected the most illuminating
of these cases to discuss. One court discussed and confused the requirements for
a valid waiver of notice of intent to accelerate; hopefully, future courts will
follow the logic set forth herein. Also addressed are cases dealing with recourse
carve-outs and related procedural issues, and the fair notice doctrine, each of
which provides good lessons to practitioners.
In the context of sales, a significant number of cases addressed breach of
implied warranties and fraud in the inducement. One particular case on fraud
in the inducement contains a majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
concerning the perplexing “as-is” clause, which continues to elude concise
judicial interpretation and appropriate drafting. Quite a few cases from the
survey period provide drafting lessons, again addressing disclaimer-of-reliance
provisions, reverters, and legal descriptions. Easements and public roads also
found their way into the cases, and the courts revisited causes of action for
declaratory judgment versus trespass to try title and jurisdiction of the Justice
Court for suits for possession versus those for title. Finally, the Texas Supreme
Court dealt with the important issue of a rolling easement along the Texas gulf
coast and found that there is none if the shoreline change is the result of an
avulsive event.1

1. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 724–25 (Tex. 2012).
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II. MORTGAGES, LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
A. TAX LIENS
In re Cowin involves a tax lien conspiracy. 2 The co-conspirators entered into a
scheme whereby one co-conspirator would acquire condominium units
purchased at a homeowners association assessment lien foreclosure sale. 3
Immediately thereafter, ad valorem taxes on the real property were paid by thirdparty financing secured by a tax lien transfer and deed of trust. 4 The property
owner defaulted on the tax lien transfer documentation resulting in a tax lien
foreclosure, with all tax lien foreclosure sale proceeds used to pay expenses,
satisfy the tax lien debt, and pay the tax lienholder the balance. 5 In Cowin, the
tax lien foreclosure trustee failed to pay any of the proceeds from the tax lien
sales to the existing first lienholder. 6 The tax lien deed of trust had distribution
provisions providing for distribution of foreclosure proceeds to expenses, tax
lien debt, any amounts required by law to be paid, and to the grantor, in that
order. 7
In the subject case, Cowin altered the distribution provisions to exclude
payments of amounts required by law to be paid. 8 Cowin attempted to defend
this position under Texas Tax Code § 32.06(j), which directs application of
proceeds from judicial foreclosure of a tax lien to court costs, the judgment
amount, attorney’s fees awarded in the judgment, and the remaining proceeds to
holders of liens on the property in the order of their priority. 9 Cowin argued
this statute was inapplicable because the subject tax lien foreclosure was
pursuant to the contractual non-judicial foreclosure provisions contained in the
tax lien deed of trust, not a judicial foreclosure contemplated by that statute.10
The federal court rejected that argument, concluding that the statute covered
additional provisions for a judicial foreclosure, but did not overturn standard
Texas foreclosure law requiring application of foreclosure sale proceeds (to the
extent of excess proceeds) to be paid to inferior lienholders. 11
As an ancillary defense, Cowin alleged that the noteholder had no standing
because it was not a beneficiary of record on the first lien deed of trust. 12 In each
of the three properties covered in this opinion, the original deed of trust recited
the beneficiary as Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as
nominee for the actual noteholder. 13 Subsequent assignments of each deed of
trust were made without recordation in the applicable county’s real property

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

In re Cowin, 492 B.R. 858, 867 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 874–75.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 875–76.
Id. at 894 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.06(j) (West 2005)).
Id. at 895.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 871–73.
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records, although such assignments were noted and recorded with MERS. 14
Cowin alleged that each noteholder had no standing since it had not complied
with the statutory requirement to the transfer or assignment of a deed of trust
pursuant to the Texas Local Government Code. 15 The court noted numerous
prior cases holding that the failure to record does not affect the validity of the
assigned deed of trust. 16 Those cases dealt with the original homeowner and
original lender, but in this case, neither the original owner nor the original
lender was involved; all parties were either an assignee lender or owner, making
this a case of first impression (as to assignee lenders and owners). 17 Analyzing
this issue, the court noted that in In re Perry 18 the focus was on whether the
claimant had a duty of inquiry regarding the deed of trust, with the conclusion
that the recorded deed of trust put a bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice as to
the status of the recorded deed of trust. 19 Consequently, this court concluded
the concept of inquiry notice was equally applicable to third parties to an
assigned deed of trust; therefore, notwithstanding the statutory provision, a
person is under a duty to inquire further about assignments of a deed of trust. 20
B. WAIVER
Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank addressed the issue of waiver of rights in a case
that involved a residential property foreclosure. 21 Richardson obtained a
residential property loan from Fannie Mae, which Wells Fargo serviced.22
Richardson defaulted in the mortgage payments and after communications
between the parties, Wells Fargo offered “temporary trial modification payment
plan” under a program known as the Home Affordable Mortgage Program
(HAMP Plan). 23 Documentation covering the HAMP Plan provided for trial
monthly payments and that payments under the HAMP Plan would not be a
waiver of acceleration of the loan or foreclosure action and would not constitute
a cure of the mortgage default. 24 Richardson made the trial payments, but did
not cure the existing defaults as required under the HAMP Plan. 25 Richardson
continued to make monthly payments, and the parties communicated regarding
a permanent modification until June 3, 2010, when Wells Fargo notified
Richardson that she did not qualify for a permanent HAMP Plan
modification. 26 Nevertheless, on August 4, 2010, Wells Fargo issued a letter
offering a special forbearance plan (Forbearance Plan), which specified that
14. Id.
15. Id. at 888 (citing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 192.007(a) (West 2008)).
16. Id. at 889.
17. Id.
18. Hill vs. U.S. Bank, N.A. (In re Perry), No. 11-35205, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 534 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Feb. 8, 2013).
19. In re Cowin, 492 B.R. at 889.
20. Id.
21. Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 800, 805–06 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
22. Id. at 806.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 807.
26. Id.

2014]

Real Property

105

performance would not bring the loan contractually current, that it would not
obligate the lender to enter into a further agreement, that it did not constitute a
waiver of the lender’s rights to insist upon strict performance in the future, that
all provisions of the note and deed of trust continued in full force and effect,
and that failure to comply with the Forbearance Plan would render the
forbearance null and void. 27 Richardson failed to execute and return a copy of
the Forbearance Plan but did make the initial payment thereunder, which
caused Wells Fargo to suspend the pending foreclosure sale. 28 Upon
Richardson’s failure to make additional payments, Wells Fargo commenced and
completed the foreclosure process.29
Richardson alleged that Wells Fargo waived its right to accelerate and
foreclose by reason of its actions. 30 The standard rule to prove waiver requires a
showing of (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; (2) actual or constructive
knowledge of its existence; and (3) an actual intent to relinquish the right (which
can be inferred from conduct). 31 However, to prove waiver based on an
inference from Wells Fargo’s conduct, the court noted that Richardson had the
onerous burden to produce conclusive evidence that Wells Fargo unequivocally
manifested its intent to no longer assert its claim. 32 Richardson asserted waiver
based on the following facts: (1) Wells Fargo proceeded with foreclosure even
though Richardson had not missed a payment under the HAMP Plan; (2) Wells
Fargo advised Richardson it would not foreclose during the existence of a formal
loan modification plan; (3) Richardson had made the first payment under the
Forbearance Plan; (4) Wells Fargo did not notify Richardson that her only
payment under the Forbearance Plan had been returned for insufficient funds;
(5) Wells Fargo had forwarded a permanent loan modification agreement (based
on Richardson’s request, but which Richardson failed to sign and return); and
(6) Wells Fargo acknowledged the foreclosure sale was due to a servicer’s error.33
The court summarily rejected each of Richardson’s arguments, holding that they
could not be construed as an unequivocal manifestation of an intent not to
assert its claim.34 In support, the court observed that Wells Fargo repeatedly
asserted its intent to maintain its right to accelerate and foreclose, and
specifically noted such provisions in the note, deed of trust, HAMP Plan, and
Forbearance Plan. 35 This case is instructive to practitioners to be diligent in all
correspondence and documentation as to whether the lender is waiving or
27. Id. at 807–08.
28. Id. at 808.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 810.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The note provided that if during a default full payment was not required, the holder
would “still have the right to [accelerate] if [maker is] in default at a later time”; the deed of trust
provided that any forbearance in exercising rights and remedies or acceptance of partial payments
“shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy”; the HAMP Plan stated
that acceptance of payments during the trial period “will not be deemed a waiver of the acceleration
. . . or foreclosure action”; and the Forbearance Plan stated that it “shall not constitute a waiver of
the lender’s right to insist upon strict performance in the future.” Id.
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preserving its rights and remedies in connection with any intervening workout
attempts on a defaulted loan.
C. ROBO SIGNING
Over the last five or so years, there have been countless number of claims
based on “robo signing,” a phrase adopted by the media. 36 In general, these cases
involve the signing of mortgage foreclosure documents and assignments of
underlying mortgage instruments by a person not technically authorized by
appropriate formalities to execute such documents. 37 Such signatory was
colloquially denominated as a “robo signer.” 38 Such “robo signing” was present
in Marsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 39 Marsh was selected for this presentation
for two reasons: first, it exemplifies the thousands of similar cases relating to the
“robo signing,” and second, it addresses an issue of first impression related to
the creation of fraudulent liens. 40 In this case, Marsh acquired residential real
estate, financing it with the execution of a note payable to MIT Lending secured
by a deed of trust in favor of “Mortgage Electronic Regulation Systems, Inc., as
Nominee for Lender and Lender’s Successors and Assigns.” 41 Subsequently,
Mortgage Electronic Regulation Systems, Inc. (MERS) assigned the note and
deed of trust to Bank of America, as trustee, for servicing. 42 Christina
Trowbridge (the “robo signer”) executed the assignment, as an authorized
signatory for MERS; however, MERS never authorized this person to execute
such conveyance. 43 Upon an attempted foreclosure, Marsh sued in state court to
enjoin the foreclosure, and the lender removed to the federal court, 44 which is
the typical procedure in these cases.
The court concluded that Marsh did not have standing to attack such
assignment based on the assignment signatory’s alleged lack of authority because
Marsh was not a party to the assignment between MERS and Bank of America
as trustee, citing numerous published and unpublished cases from Texas
consistent with that holding.45 Since the deed of trust clearly identified MERS as
the nominee for the original lender, the court concluded MERS was a
mortgagee under the Texas Property Code 46 and therefore could authorize Bank
of America, as trustee, to service and foreclose the loan regardless of whether
36. Jacob L. White, “Robo-Signing”: A Symptom of the Shortcomings in Maryland’s Policy of
Expediting Foreclosure Proceedings, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 81, 81–82 (2011).
37. Id. at 86–87.
38. See id.
39. Marsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 888 F. Supp. 2d 805, 810 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
40. Id. at 810, 813; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 51.903(a) (West 2013) (addresses
fraudulent liens).
41. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 810.
42. Id. at 807.
43. Id. at 808.
44. Id. at 807.
45. Id. at 809; but see the holding in Miller v. Homecomings Financial discussed in Section II.D.,
which concludes that a debtor/mortgagor has standing to challenge the authority or right of the
foreclosing mortgagee.
46. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 811. The court failed to specify the provision of the Texas
Property Code to which it referred, but this author believes that it would be TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 53.025 (West 2013).
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MERS was the true owner of the note. 47
Marsh also contended that the assignment was a fraudulent document within
the meaning of Texas Government Code § 51.901(c), 48 but the court
determined that Marsh lacked standing to allege the fraudulent lien claim
because Marsh was not a party to the assignment. 49 Nevertheless, the court
proceeded to analyze Section 51.903(a) of the Texas Government Code as well
as Section 12.002(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which
prevents a person from making or recording a document with knowledge that
the document is a fraudulent lien or claim against real property.50 Two federal
cases had conflicting decisions and there were no Texas state courts which had
yet considered the issue of “whether an assignment of a note and deed of trust
can constitute a lien under chapter 12 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.” 51 In Garcia v. Bank of New York Mellon, a lien was considered a claim in
property for payment of a debt secured by a security interest, and the court held
that chapter 12 did not govern the assignment. 52 On the other hand, Kingman
Holdings, LLC v. CitiMortgage, Inc. suggested that an assignment of a deed of trust
may constitute a “lien” under chapter 12 in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion 53 to dismiss.54 In its analysis, the Marsh court looked at the plain and
common meaning of the statute’s words and the Texas legislative history.55 The
plain and common meaning of the statute’s words lead to the conclusion that
the Texas legislature did not intend to address mortgage assignments in chapter
12 since “[t]he assignment or transfer of an interest in property is distinct from a
‘claim’ in property.” 56 Further, the court found legislative history indicating the
purpose of the statute was to “create a private cause of action against a person
who files fraudulent judgment liens or fraudulent documents purporting to
create [as opposed to assign] a lien or claim against real . . . property.” 57
Consequently, the court concluded that a cause of action under Section 12.002
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code must challenge the lien
instrument directly and not an assignment of the lien. 58
D. STANDING—ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE
Miller v. Homecomings Financial concerns a challenge on the chain of title for
assignments of a mortgage on residential real property securing a home equity

47. Id. at 811; see also infra text accompanying notes 12–20 (discussion of similar issue in
Cowin).
48. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 51.901(c) (West 2013).
49. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
50. Id. at 812–14 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 12.002(a) (West 2012)).
51. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 813.
52. Garcia v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 3:12-CV-0062-D, 2012 WL 692099, at *1 (N. D. Tex.
Mar. 5, 2012).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
54. Kingman Holding, LLC v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-619, 2011 WL 1883829, at
*4–6 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2011).
55. Marsh, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 813.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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loan. 59 The court’s opinion is well-reasoned, concise, and authoritative, pointing
out fallacies in numerous other federal court cases.60 The facts in Miller follow
the typical factual context: the debtor obtains a residential home loan with a
lender; the mortgage debt is assigned one or more times to the foreclosing
lender; the debtor challenges the foreclosure in a state court proceeding; and the
foreclosing lender removes the case to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction. 61 Miller’s home equity loan was from Homecomings Financial
Network, Inc. 62 Upon default, Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company
initiated foreclosure proceedings, as the assignee of the deed of trust from
JPMorgan Chase Bank as trustee. 63 There was no evidence reflecting an
assignment from Homecomings Financial Network, Inc. to any of the defendant
lenders, including JPMorgan Chase Bank as trustee or Bank of New York
Mellon Trust Company. 64
Miller challenged the pending foreclosure because a proper chain of title to
the note and deed of trust could not be shown. 65 The lenders challenged the
standing of Miller to contest the assignment because Miller was not a party to
such documents and no cognizable legal theory supported their lack of authority
to foreclose.66 The court began by discussing the cognizable legal claim, citing
numerous Texas cases recognizing a debtor’s right to challenge a wrongful
foreclosure.67 The court concluded that the only party with standing to initiate a
non-judicial foreclosure sale is the mortgagee or mortgage servicer acting on
behalf of the current mortgagee. 68 If the foreclosing mortgagee is not the original
mortgagee named in the deed of trust, then factual issues may arise as to the
authority of such foreclosing party, who must be able to verify its chain of title
back to the original mortgagee. 69
Status as an appropriate mortgagee for foreclosure can be established in one
of two ways.70 First, the party can prove “it is the ‘holder’ of the note secured by
the deed of trust.” 71 The holder of a negotiable instrument can be shown by
proof that the party is the payee or a holder by negotiation with a transfer of
physical possession of the note. 72 “[N]egotiation requires both the transfer of
possession and written indorsement by the holder.” 73 Therefore, a party other
59. Miller v. Homecomings Fin., 881 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
60. See id. at 825–33.
61. See id. at 827.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 828, 831.
67. Id. at 828 (citing League City State Bank v. Mares, 427 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Martin v. New Century Mortgage Co., 377 S.W.3d 79,
81–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ballestas, 355
S.W.3d 187, 189–90 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Leavings v. Mills, 175 S.W.3d
301, 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)).
68. Id. at 828 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.001(4) (West 2013)).
69. Id. at 829.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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than the original payee of a note “must prove ‘successive transfers of possession
and indorsement’ establishing an ‘unbroken chain of title.’” 74 The second
method of establishing appropriate mortgagee status is to prove the “party is the
‘owner’ of the note under common law principles of assignment.” 75 In
conclusion, the court held that “[a]s a matter of Texas law, . . . homeowners such
as the Millers do have a cognizable cause of action to challenge a party’s right to
foreclosure on their property.” 76 Consequently, the court concluded that the
ubiquitous “show me the note” defense is only partially correct in that being the
holder of the “original note is only one way to establish the right to foreclose,
but it is not the only way.” 77 The court approved Miller’s contention that the
lenders must show a proper chain of title to the deed of trust. 78 Traditionally,
this is proven by chain of title pursuant to instruments filed in the real property
records. 79 The court noted that “[t]he Texas Property Code provides that ‘if the
security instrument has been assigned of record, the last person to whom the
security interest has been assigned of record’ is the mortgagee.” 80
Furthermore, the court recognized the Texas statute requiring “that any
transfer or assignments of recorded mortgages must also be recorded in the
office of the county clerk.” 81 The court declared that Texas Local Government
Code § 192.007(a) has not been interpreted, citing Dallas County v. MERSCorp,
Inc. 82 Consequently, the court noted that the gap in the chain of title of
assignments was sufficient to entitle the homeowner to injunctive relief against
the threatened foreclosure. 83
Next, the defendant lenders challenged the plaintiffs’ standing because they
were not parties to the assignment.84 Although the lenders cited numerous
federal district cases disallowing standing, the court totally emasculated those
prior decisions by indicating that six were issued by the same magistrate judge,
none cited any Texas case law or statute, and all but one of the cases relied upon
a single federal case, Eskridge v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,85 which cited
no state or federal authority.86 On the other hand, the court noted Texas courts
have “long followed the common law rule which permits a debtor to assert

74. Id. (citing Leavings v. Mills, 175 S.W.3d 301, 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no
pet.)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 829–30.
77. Id. at 830.
78. Id. at 830–31.
79. Id. at 830.
80. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.001(4)(C) (West 2013)).
81. Id. (discussing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 192.007(a) (West 2013) (In relevant part,
this statute reads: “To . . . assign . . . an instrument that is . . . recorded in the office of the county
clerk, a person must . . . record another instrument relating to the action in the same manner as
the original instrument is required to be . . . recorded.”)).
82. Id. (citing Dallas County v. MERSCorp., Inc., 11-CV-2733, 2013 WL 5903300 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 4, 2013)).
83. Id. at 830–31.
84. Id. at 831.
85. Id. (citing Eskridge v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2011 WL 2163989, at *5 (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 28, 2011).
86. Id.
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against an assignee any ground that renders the assignment void or invalid.” 87
Further, the court looked to Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence in
support of such general rule of law. 88 The only exception to this general rule
related to “voidable” defenses, not applicable in the current case.89 Further, the
court cited federal district court cases that allowed chain of title challenges to
foreclosures. 90 In support of this, the court noted the rationale that a debtor
could be subject to foreclosure of its property by one foreclosing creditor, while
at the same time being liable on a debt in the hands of another creditor. 91
Therefore, to avoid the double jeopardy, the chain of title must be proven from
the original owner and holder of the note and deed of trust to the current
foreclosing lender. 92 Thus, “under Texas law homeowners have legal standing to
challenge the validity or effectiveness of any assignment or chain of assignments
under which a party claims the right to foreclose on their property.” 93
E. RULE 736 FORECLOSURE
Wells Fargo Bank v. Robinson deals with foreclosure of a home equity loan
made pursuant to the Texas Constitution and pursuant to an expedited
foreclosure under Rule 736 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 94 In Robinson,
the home equity loan was in default, and Wells Fargo proceeded with an
application for court approval of the foreclosure.95 The parties ultimately
reached an agreement allowing Robinson an additional time period to sell the
house, and the trial court signed an order under Rule 736 stating that Wells
Fargo was authorized to proceed with foreclosure, to post the property before
April 14, 2008, and foreclose on May 6, 2008. 96 However, Wells Fargo did not
post until May 12, 2008 and conducted a foreclosure on June 3, 2008. 97 The
court held that the court order did not authorize Wells Fargo to foreclose on a
date other than the date specified in the court order, and therefore, it
wrongfully foreclosed.98 In support, the court analyzed the applicable provisions
of the Texas Constitution, which includes a requirement that the lien of a home
equity loan may be foreclosed upon only by court order.99 By violating the court

87. Id.
88. Id. (citing 6A C.J.S. Assignment § 132 (May 2012)); 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignment § 119 (May
2012)).
89. Id. at 831–32.
90. Id. at 832 (citing Millet v. JPMorgan Chase, N.A., No. SA-11-CV-1031-XR, 2012 WL
1029497, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2012); Norwood v. Chase Home Finance LLC, No. A-09-CA940-JRN, 2011 WL 197874 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011)).
91. Id.
92. Id.; but see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.0001(4) (West Supp. 2013) (defining a proper
“mortgagee” for foreclosure only in terms of being the holder of a security instrument with no
mention of a note).
93. Miller, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
94. Wells Fargo Bank v. Robinson, 391 S.W.3d 590, 592–95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no
pet.).
95. Id. at 592–93.
96. Id. at 593.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6).
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order in deferring the foreclosure for a month, Wells Fargo wrongfully
foreclosed. 100 Practitioners should take note of this narrow holding and seek
court orders under Rule 736 proceedings to allow for foreclosure on a specified
date or within some period thereafter.
F. EXECUTION DEED
Mosby v. Post Oak Bank involved a dispute between a deed of trust lien
foreclosure purchaser and an execution sale purchaser.101 Post Oak Bank held a
deed of trust executed by Tinmore and filed on April 17, 2007. 102 Judgment was
rendered in favor of Morrell Masonry against Tinmore on September 30, 2008
with a writ of execution and order of sale issued on December 9, 2008.103 The
execution sale occurred on February 3, 2009, pursuant to which Mosby acquired
the subject property. 104 An execution deed was recorded on March 18, 2009,
conveying to Mosby all of the right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor
Tinmore. 105 Post Oak Bank ultimately foreclosed on its deed of trust lien on
June 2, 2009, setting up the dispute between the bank as the deed of trust
foreclosure purchaser and Mosby as the execution sale purchaser. 106 In what the
court described as a case of first impression, the court addressed the meaning of
the execution section under the Texas Property Code. 107 This statute provides
that the “conveyance of real property by an officer legally authorized to sell the
property . . . passes absolute title to the property to the purchaser.” 108 Mosby
relied on the “absolute title” language by asserting that it extinguished the prior
deed of trust lien held by Post Oak Bank. 109 The court rejected this contention,
noting that subsection (a) of the statute excludes any affect against a person who
does not claim under a party to the conveyance or judgment. 110 In this case, Post
Oak Bank was neither a party to the conveyance by the execution deed nor a
party to the original judgment. 111 Additionally, the court noted that the
execution deed only conveyed “whatever interest Tinmore . . . had in the
[p]roperty.” 112 Consequently, the execution sale under the statute did not affect
the superior lien position of Post Oak Bank. 113

100. Robinson, 391 S.W.3d at 593.
101. Mosby v. Post Oak Bank, 401 S.W.3d 183, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011,
pet. denied).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 186.
107. Id. at 187 (discussing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.004(a) (West 2010)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 187 n.3.
113. Id. at 187.
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III. DEBTOR/CREDITOR
A. INSURANCE ESCROWS
Garcia v. Bank of America Corp. deals with insurance placed by the lender
when the borrower failed to obtain insurance for the mortgaged property. 114
Garcia, as the homeowner, obtained a loan and executed a deed of trust that
contained a typical insurance escrow provision requiring Garcia to maintain
insurance sufficient to protect the mortgagee’s interest in the property; however,
if Garcia failed to provide such insurance, the mortgage authorized the
mortgagee to purchase insurance for the property, but it did not require
mortgagee to protect the homeowner’s interest in the property. 115 After the
court concluded that Garcia was not a third party beneficiary under the forced
placed insurance, it addressed issues of good faith and fair dealing, and the
fiduciary duty of the lender to renew the homeowner’s insurance policy and use
the escrow account funds for payment of the insurance premiums. 116 As to the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, the escrow provisions in Garcia’s mortgage
did not create a special relationship and, therefore, created no duty of good faith
and fair dealing. 117
On the issue of fiduciary duty, the language of the mortgage proved
instrumental in that it required the lender to use funds in the escrow account to
pay insurance premiums, but it did not require the lender to obtain a renewal of
the insurance policy, which was an obligation of the homeowner. 118
Consequently, since Garcia allowed the insurance policy to lapse without
furnishing a renewal invoice to the lender for payment of the premium, the
lender had no duty to affirmatively seek out a renewal of the homeowner’s
insurance policy and pay the premiums using funds from the insurance escrow
account. 119 Practitioners should be certain that escrow provisions in their
documents clearly establish the distinction between the duty to obtain or renew
the insurance as opposed to the mere payment of the premiums when an invoice
is presented.
B. DEFICIENCY LAWSUIT
In a deficiency lawsuit following foreclosure, Preston Reserve, L.L.C. v. Compass
Bank demonstrates clearly what a lender should not do. 120 Preston Reserve
owned land upon which there was a debt at the time of foreclosure of $2.4
million, which was guaranteed by Howe. 121 The lender foreclosed and bid $1.2

114. Garcia v. Bank of America Corp., 375 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2012, no pet.).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 326–34.
117. Id. at 332.
118. Id. at 334.
119. Id. at 334–35.
120. See Preston Reserve, L.L.C. v. Compass Bank, 373 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
121. Id.
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million, leaving a deficiency. 122 Upon suit for the deficiency amount, the parties
had to present evidence of the fair market value of the property. 123 During trial,
Howe testified as an expert witness that the value of the property was $2.7
million; however, the lender did not introduce any expert opinion testimony as
to the fair market value of the property, relying upon the Property Owner Rule
to allow one of its corporate officers to testify as to fair market value. 124 In this
case, the lender’s workout loan officer, Scott, testified that his experience
included the foreclosure on real estate collateral and the reselling of over 5,000
properties after foreclosure. 125 Based on this testimony, the court deemed Scott
an officer with a managerial position and duties related to the property, making
him a proper party to testify under the Property Owner Rule. 126
However, as to his opinion on fair market value of the property, Scott
testified that his opinion was based upon (1) offers received, (2) information
provided by internal and external valuation experts, (3) zoning for the property,
(4) plat deadlines for development, (5) a flood plain determination, and (6)
availability of financing for raw land. 127 The Property Owner Rule requires that
the witness must testify as to his personal familiarity with the property and its
fair market value, and that if such officer or employee lacks personal knowledge,
then his testimony does not constitute evidence under the Property Owner
Rule. 128 Consequently, the court concluded that the factors considered by Scott
did not “demonstrate Scott’s personal familiarity with the property’s value and
knowledge of the market at the time of the foreclosure sale.” 129 However, there
is a dissenting opinion that finds the knowledge of each of these factors to be
evidence of personal familiarity with the property and its fair market value. 130
Also, additional information presented at trial on the property’s fair market
value was deemed no evidence and could not support the trial court’s
judgment.131 The first was the foreclosure sale bid price. 132 Texas law is clear that
a foreclosure sale bid does not constitute fair market value. 133 Under Texas law,
fair market value is “the price the property will bring when offered for sale by
one who desires to sell, but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one who

122. Id.
123. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b) (West 2010) (providing, in relevant part,
that the court “determine the fair market value of the real property as of the date of the foreclosure
sale.”)).
124. Id. at 656, 658. Under general Texas law, a property owner is qualified to testify
concerning the value of his own property even if he is not an expert and could not be qualified as
such. Id. at 659 (citing Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1984)). However, as to corporate
entities, the “Property Owner Rule” allows for officers “in a managerial position with duties”
related to the property, or employees of the entity with substantial equivalent positions and duties
to testify as a “owner” as to the property’s fair market value. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 659.
127. Id. at 660–61.
128. Id. at 661.
129. Id. at 662.
130. Id. at 671 (McCally, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 663–66 (Boyce, J., majority).
132. Id. at 663.
133. Id.
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desires to buy, but is under no necessity of buying.” 134 Second, evidence of the
property’s resale price a year after foreclosure was not deemed competent
evidence because the record did not include evidence of whether the sale was
out of the ordinary, how the property was marketed, and whether market
conditions were comparable to the time of the foreclosure sale.135 Third, an
unaccepted offer presented to the bank two weeks after the foreclosure sale was
not competent evidence since unaccepted offers to purchase property are not
evidence of the market value of the property. 136 The court concluded that since
there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of a fair
market value of $2.4 million, and since the only legally sufficient evidence was
that of Howe’s testimony of a $2.7 million value, the summary judgment could
not be sustained and was reversed. 137
This case should be instructive to practitioners on proving the fair market
value of a property. However, this author finds the position of the dissenting
opinion on the “personal familiarity” of the witness to be more persuasive. 138
Hopefully, this can be reconsidered and clarified in future decisions, but in the
interim, practitioners should be mindful of the majority view in this case.
C. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
Basley v. Adoni Holdings addressed a fraudulent transfer issue. 139 Dodeka
obtained an $8,614.64 judgment against Whitt for a credit card debt. 140
Eventually, Dodeka discovered a house owned by Whitt and obtained a writ of
execution. 141 On February 2, 2010, a constable sale was conducted, and the
property was sold for $4,442.43 to Adoni. 142 On February 18, 2010, before the
constable’s deed to Adoni was recorded, Whitt signed a general warranty deed
conveying the property to her niece, her sister, and her brother, who promptly
recorded the deed. 143 Upon discovering the Whitt conveyance, Dodeka brought
an action alleging fraudulent transfer under the Fraudulent Transfer Act. 144 On
appeal, the issue was whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
establish a fraudulent transfer. 145 At trial, Whitt summarized her assets as
including her home (subject to a mortgage), her automobiles, personal property,
134. Id. at 658 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1981)).
135. Id. at 663.
136. Id. at 664 (citing Lee v. Lee, 47 S.W.3d 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
denied)).
137. Id. at 666, 669–70.
138. See generally id. at 671 (McCally, Jr., dissenting).
139. Basley v. Adoni Holdings, LLC, 373 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no
pet.).
140. Id. at 581.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (referring to the TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.006(a), (b) (West 2009)
(providing in relevant part that a fraudulent transfer occurs “if the debtor made the transfer . . .
without receiving reasonable equivalent value . . . and the debtor was insolvent at that time.”
Further, the Fraudulent Transfer Act defines when a debtor is insolvent as being when “the sum of
the debtor’s debts is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at a fair valuation.”)).
145. Id. at 582.
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and a bank account. 146 However, Dodeka’s counsel never asked about the
balance of the bank account and did not establish evidence of her assets at the
time of transfer, as opposed to the time of trial. 147 Consequently, the court
determined that the creditor had the burden to establish the amount and nature
of Whitt’s assets and liabilities at the time of the transfer but failed to establish
either. 148
Failing this, the creditor argued a presumption of insolvency under the
Fraudulent Transfer Act due to the debtor generally not paying debts as they
came due.149 Evidence established that Whitt had not paid the judgment and
was delinquent in ad valorem taxes on the property, but there was no further
evidence of Whitt’s debt and payment status. 150 The court found this to
establish a mere suspicion, which was less than a scintilla of evidence, and
accordingly, was insufficient to support a conclusion of insolvency. 151 In
support, the court noted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)
comments as to whether a debtor was genuinely paying its debts as they became
due. 152 The list of factors under the UFTA were the amount of debt, due date of
the debts, number of debts, proportion of debts not being paid, duration of the
nonpayment, existence of bona fide disputes, and other special circumstances, as
well as consideration of the debtor’s payment practices and the payment
practices of the debtor’s trade or industry. 153 Since the creditor in Basley failed to
establish anything other than the credit card debt and the delinquency in ad
valorem taxes, the court held that it was insufficient evidence to support a
conclusion that Whitt was insolvent.154 While this case does not present any
unique principal, it is informative to practitioners as to the details needed to
establish a debtor’s insolvency at the time of an alleged fraudulent transfer.
D. USURY CURE
In Lagow v. Hamon ex rel. Roach, the court addressed the cure by a lender of a
usury claim under the Texas Finance Code. 155 Lagow obtained a loan from
Hamon and ultimately defaulted. When Hamon filed suit to collect, Lagow
counterclaimed for usury. 156 Hamon responded with a general denial and a plea

146. Id. at 582–83.
147. Id. at 583.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.003(b) (West 2009)).
150. Id. at 584.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2, cmt. 2, 7A U.L.A. 38 (2006)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Lagow v. Hamon ex rel. Roach, 384 SW.3d 411, 415–16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.)
(discussing TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.006(d) (West 2006) (providing, in relevant part, that a
creditor may avoid liability for usury when a defendant files a counterclaim alleging usurious
interest, if the creditor upon application to the court, files an abatement for sixty days, and
“[d]uring the abatement period the creditor may correct a violation,” and as part of the correction,
“the creditor shall offer to pay the obligor’s reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the
court.”)).
156. Id. at 414.
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in abatement, which the trial court granted. 157 Later on the same day, Hamon
filed two motions for summary judgment. 158 Lagow asserted that Hamon had
waived the right to correct the usury violation by filing the motions for summary
judgment. 159 First, Lagow argued that the applicable provisions of the Texas
Finance Code were similar to provisions in the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices—Consumer Protection Act, which required the plea in abatement at
the time of filing an answer or very soon thereafter. 160 The court distinguished
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act from the Texas Finance Code on the basis
that the usury statute is considered penal in nature and that the Texas Supreme
Court has held the Deceptive Trade Practices Act to be non-penal in nature. 161
Since the usury statute is penal in nature, the court must construe that section
leniently as to the creditor. 162 Consequently, the prompt plea in abatement
requirement under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is not applicable to the
usury penalty provisions under the Texas Finance Code. 163 Further, the court
determined that Hamon’s motion for continuance was not a de facto abatement
since the motion for continuance related solely to additional time for discovery
and exploration of settlement and mediation, but it did not include any facts for
which a plea in abatement would be applicable. 164
Furthermore, Lagow asserted the summary judgment motions constituted a
waiver of the abatement rights. 165 In this regard, the court noted that although
Hamon filed the plea in abatement and motions for summary judgment
contemporaneously, Hamon did not file them in the alternative. 166 However, in
the hearing on the plea in abatement, the creditor’s council stated that the
motions for summary judgment were “contingent on how the [trial] court rules
on the plea in abatement.” 167 Consequently, the court concluded that Hamon
did not waive a plea in abatement. 168
The facts showed that Hamon, within the applicable sixty day period,
provided notice to Lagow of a correction in the interest rate charged and offered
to pay all of Lagow’s legal fees related to the usury defense. 169 The trial court
ordered that the attorney’s fees awarded to Lagow on her usury counterclaim
would be offset against the amounts owed to Hamon under the promissory
notes.170 Hamon alleged that this was error, and the court reviewed the

157. Id. at 414–15.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 415.
160. Id. at 416 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505 (West 2011)).
161. Id. at 417 (citing Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690–91 (Tex. 1980)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 418 (noting that “a plea in abatement challenges the plaintiff’s pleading by asserting
that facts outside the pleading prevent the suit from going forward until the problem can be
cured”).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 418.
168. Id. at 419.
169. Id. at 414, 419–20.
170. Id. at 420.
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applicable provisions of the Texas Finance Code. 171 The court noted that the
plain language of the statutory provisions did not direct how attorney’s fees
should be paid. 172 Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court did not
err by ordering the attorney’s fees to be offset against amounts owed under the
promissory note. 173 This case presents a valuable lesson in the procedural aspects
of curing a usury claim.
E. NOTICE OF INTENT TO ACCELERATE
Mathis v. DCR Mortgage III SUB I, L.L.C. involved a suit on a promissory note
and construction of the waiver of notice of intent to accelerate. 174 Mathis
executed a note and deed of trust in favor of DCR Mortgage. 175 The note
included a fairly standard waiver provision providing: “except as expressly
provided herein, [maker] waives all notices (including, without limitation, notice
of intent to accelerate [and] notice of acceleration).” 176 However, the deed of
trust provided in the default provisions: “If grantor defaults on the note . . . and
the default continues after [lender] gives [grantor] notice of the default and the
time within which it must be cured . . ., then [lender] may . . . declare the
unpaid principal balance and earned interest on the note immediately due.” 177
The facts disclosed that Mathis was perennially late in making payments and
that DCR did not issue a separate notice letter regarding its intent to
accelerate. 178 The issue on appeal was whether the note and deed of trust, read
together, were effective to waive the obligation of the lender to give a notice of
intent to accelerate. 179 The court acknowledged that a provision waiving a notice
of intent to accelerate, whether contained in a note or deed of trust, is effective
as long as the waiver is clear and unequivocal. 180 However, since the note and
deed of trust were signed concurrently, both documents must be read together,
and the note and deed of trust did not demonstrate a clear and unequivocal
waiver of the right to receive a notice of intent to accelerate. 181
While the statement of law in this case appears well founded, this author
believes the court has misconstrued the applicable note and deed of trust
provisions. The deed of trust contains the default language that creates the
uncertainty. 182 That provision provided that upon failure to make timely
payments, if such default continued after notice of the default was given and the
171. Id. (citing TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.006(d) (West 2005) (providing, in relevant part:
“[T]he creditor shall offer to pay the obligor’s reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court
based on the hours reasonably expended by the obligor’s counsel with regard to the alleged
violation before the abatement.”)).
172. Id. at 421.
173. Id.
174. Mathis v. DCR Mortg. III SUB I, L.L.C., 389 S.W.3d 494, 496 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012,
no pet.).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 498.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 505.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 507–08.
182. See id. at 505–06.
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cure period had lapsed without cure, then the note could be accelerated. 183 This
opinion confuses the difference between a notice of default with a cure period
and a notice of intent to accelerate. 184 Under the circumstances of this case, a
notice of default and right to cure should have been sent to the borrower. The
failure to cure such a default within the applicable time period would have
caused the default to ripen into an event allowing acceleration. At that time, the
waiver of notice of intent to accelerate, contained in a separate sentence in the
default provision of the deed of trust, would have become applicable. 185
Without correcting this distinction, this case could become problematic for a
lender that, pursuant to its loan documents, having given a notice of default and
the cure period having elapsed, would be faced with a question of whether a
waiver of intent to accelerate at that time is applicable or whether an additional
notice of intent to accelerate is required under the Mathis holding. Hopefully,
subsequent decisions can clarify the answer to this question.
IV. GUARANTIES/INDEMNITIES
A. RECOURSE CARVEOUTS
The issue of recourse carveouts was discussed in Wells Fargo Bank v. Smuck &
White, a case falling just outside the survey period but important enough to
include. 186 MBS-The Falls, Ltd. obtained a nonrecourse loan that was subject to
certain nonrecourse carve-outs, which are exceptions to the nonrecourse
language in a note and which create full or partial liability for the debtor in the
event of certain occurrences. 187 As a loan condition, the lender required two
principals of the borrower, Smuck and White, to execute a document entitled
Non-Recourse Indemnification Agreement. 188 Upon default, Wells Fargo sued
the borrower and the two individual indemnitors/guarantors in Tarrant County
under the non-recourse exceptions, alleging waste and impairment of foreclosure
rights due to the filing of prohibited liens. 189 Wells Fargo obtained an
183. Id.
184. See id. at 507–08.
185. See id. at 505.
186. Wells Fargo Bank v. Smuck & White, 407 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).
187. Id. The applicable nonrecourse exceptions in the subject note read, in relevant part, as
follows:
Borrower’s liability under this Note . . . shall only extend to the Mortgaged Property
. . . ; provided, however, the foregoing shall not: (a) impair the right of Lender to
bring suit and obtain personal, recourse judgment against . . . Borrower . . . relating
to . . . waste . . . ; (b) impair the right of Lender to . . . obtain a judgment . . . or to
foreclose. . . . Borrower’s liability under the Non-Recourse Exceptions . . . shall be
limited to the amount of any losses or damages sustained by Lender in connection
with such Non-Recourse Exceptions . . . .
Id. at 832–33.
188. Id. at 833. The Non-Recourse Indemnification Agreement, characterized by the court as a
guaranty, read, in relevant part, as follows: “Indemnitor hereby assumes liability for . . . any and all
liabilities, obligations, losses, damages, costs and expenses . . . incurred by or awarded against
Lender and for which Borrower at any time may be personally liable pursuant to the Nonrecourse
Exceptions.” Id. at 833, 835.
189. Id. at 833–34.
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interlocutory summary judgment on its non-recourse claims against the
borrower, and when that summary judgment became final, Wells Fargo, in a bit
of clever procedural maneuvering, nonsuited without prejudice its claims against
the individual guarantors, Smuck and White. 190 Then Wells Fargo sued the
individuals in Harris County under the indemnification agreement, offering
evidence only of the note, indemnification agreement, and the Tarrant County
case pleadings and final judgment. 191 The Harris County court ruled against
Wells Fargo. 192 The issue on appeal was whether the Tarrant County judgment
established the basis upon which Smuck and White were liable under the NonRecourse Indemnification Agreement.193
Smuck contended that the indemnity was only applicable to claims brought
against Wells Fargo by a third party, not as to Wells Fargo’s own losses caused by
the borrower’s breach. 194 The court analyzed the contract language without
relying on the title of the document. 195 The court concluded that the provisions
clearly encompassed Wells Fargo’s own losses, damages, costs, and expenses, and
that the indemnification agreement was essentially a guaranty. 196 Further, the
court analyzed the purpose of the document and concluded that provisions
relating to waste and impairment of rights to foreclose were inconsistent with
Smuck’s argument that the document only related to third party claims. 197 Also,
the court noted and distinguished other cases relating to the same parties in
similar financing arrangements.198 Moreover, the court stated that allowing these
individual indemnitors/guarantors to require Wells Fargo to reprove all of the
elements for recovery “would amount to allowing an impermissible, collateral
attack on the Tarrant County Judgment.” 199 Wells Fargo either had to prove it
had obtained the Tarrant County judgment based on the non-recourse
exceptions or, absent such judgment, prove the non-recourse exceptions; the
court determined that Wells Fargo had established the Tarrant County
judgment
based
on
non-recourse
exceptions
and
that
the
indemnitors/guarantors could not attack such judgment since it would be an
impermissible collateral attack. 200 Practitioners are hereby warned that not
addressing directly any defenses under a non-recourse exceptions provision in a
note may have adverse consequences on subsequent actions against a guarantor
who had recourse liability if the borrower/obligor was found to be personally
liable.

190. Id. at 834.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 835.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 836–37 (discussing Wells Fargo Bank v. MBS-The Hills, Ltd., No. 02-10-00289-CV,
2013 WL 4033622 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 8, 2013, no pet.) (holding that a similar
indemnification agreement was a guaranty of the Borrower’s liability under the Non-Recourse
Exceptions, including Wells Fargo’s own losses in connection with the Non-Recourse Exceptions)).
199. Id. at 838.
200. Id. at 843.
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B. FAIR NOTICE DOCTRINE
The fair notice doctrine for indemnification provisions was addressed in Tutle
& Tutle Trucking v. EOG Resources. 201 While this case related to a personal injury
rather than real property, the ruling on the indemnification applies to typical
real estate indemnity provisions. Tutle entered into a master service contract
with EOG to haul sand to be used for oil and gas well fracking. 202 Henderson,
an employee of Tutle, was assisting a third party, Frack Source, in unloading the
sand when equipment run by Frack Source, which had been defectively
modified, caused an injury to Henderson. 203 Frack Source demanded EOG
indemnify it under a separate service contract, and EOG made demand on Tutle
for defense and indemnity. 204
The master service agreement between EOG and Tutle contained various
indemnity provisions in paragraphs 6A through 6E. 205 Paragraphs 6A and 6B
were typical broad indemnification provisions between EOG and Tutle, which
were set forth in capital letters and larger font than the rest of the contract. 206
However, the “pass through provisions” were contained in paragraph 6E, which
had neither capital letters nor larger font. 207 In analyzing the fair notice
doctrine, the court dismissed the first requirement, being the express negligence
doctrine, because the facts did not relate to the party’s own negligence. 208 This
left the focus on the conspicuousness requirement.209 Even though the pass
through paragraph was not capitalized or in a larger font, the court found it was
conspicuous because (1) the numbering for the paragraph was capitalized, which
was different from other non-indemnity provisions in the contract; (2) the
location of the pass through paragraph, being paragraph 6E, was numerically
linked to paragraphs 6A and 6B, the capitalized and larger font indemnity
provisions between the two parties; (3) paragraph 6E was not buried within the
contract or located away from the other indemnity provisions; and (4) it was on
the same page as part of the other conspicuous indemnity provisions.210 While
this decision seems, to this author, to be weak on substance, practitioners
should be aware of the consequences of such provisions, as well as drafting
requirements needed for conspicuousness.

201. Tutle & Tutle Trucking v. EOG Res., 391 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet.
dism’d) (The fair notice doctrine holds that indemnity provisions are valid and enforceable if they
satisfy two fair notice requirements: (1) the express negligence doctrine requiring the intent of the
parties to be specifically stated, and (2) the conspicuousness requirement for the indemnity
language in the document.).
202. Id. at 242.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 242–43.
206. See id. at 243.
207. Id. at 243–44. The “pass through provisions” required indemnification from claims of
third parties where the indemnities related to or were ancillary to the work contemplated under the
master service contract. Id.
208. Id. at 247.
209. Id. at 245–47.
210. Id. at 246.
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C. WAIVER OF DEFICIENCY OFFSET
Interstate 35/Chisam Road, L.P. v. Moayedi considered the effectiveness of
waiving the Texas deficiency offset statute with broad, generic waiver language
contained in a guaranty. 211 Moayedi executed a guaranty of debt incurred by an
affiliated entity, which contained broad waivers of defenses. 212 Moayedi argued
that the guaranty waiver provisions were not effective to waive the provisions of
the Texas deficiency offset statute because such a waiver would frustrate the
stated purpose of that statute.213 The court rejected Moayedi’s position,
concluding that the waiver language was “enforceable as a matter of law to waive
the offset rights” under the Texas deficiency offset statute. 214
First, the court noted that Texas had a strong public policy in favor of
preserving the freedom of contract under the Texas constitution. 215
Furthermore, the court noted that the legislature had the opportunity but chose
not to provide that this statute was non-waivable, noting legislative history;216
two prior cases holding that such statute was waivable; 217 and the use of the
words “any,” “each,” and “every” in the waiver paragraph as being broad,
conclusive, and conveying the intent that the guaranty would be subject to no
defenses other than payment. 218 Further, four other paragraphs supported its
conclusion. 219
V. PURCHASER/SELLER
A. LIMITATIONS—DISCOVERY RULE
Collective Asset Partners, LLC v. McDade addressed the discovery rule allowing
the extension of the two-year statute of limitation period in a negligent
misrepresentation case. 220 Collective Asset Partners (CAP) acquired property
from Schaumburg with financing from Legend Bank. 221 As part of the financing

211. Interstate 35/Chisam Road, L.P. v. Moayedi, 377 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Tex. App.—Dallas,
2012, pet. granted) (addressing the agreement’s impact on TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(b)
(West 2007)).
212. Id. at 794. Specifically, the guaranty provided as follows: “Guarantor further agrees that
this Guaranty shall not be discharged, impaired or affected by . . . (b) any defense (other than the
full payment of the indebtedness” and “each and every such defense being hereby waived by the
undersigned Guarantor.” Id.
213. Id. at 795.
214. Id. at 801.
215. Id. at 797.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 798 (citing LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Sleutel, 289 F.3d 837 (5th Cir. 2002); Segal v.
Emmes Capital L.L.C., 155 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. dism’d) (Op. on
Reh’g)).
218. Id. at 800.
219. Id. 800–01 (citing paragraph 1 (“‘unconditionally, absolutely and irrevocably’ guaranteeing
payment”); paragraph 2 (waiving diligence and collection); paragraph 3 (allowing enforcement of
guaranty without exhaustion of collateral); and paragraph 5 (allowing release of collateral security
without impairment or diminishment of the guaranty obligations)).
220. Collective Asset Partners, LLC v. McDade, 400 S.W.3d 213, 218 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013,
no pet.).
221. Id. at 215–16.
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process, Legend acquired an appraisal that valued the property at $10,250,000
and noted that it was located in flood zone AE. 222 The appraisal specified that it
was solely for the benefit of Legend Bank and no other parties could rely upon
it. 223 CAP obtained knowledge of the flood zone in connection with and at the
time of closing by reason of (1) the appraisal’s executive summary that revealed
the flood zone; (2) the FEMA map showing the property in the flood zone,
which was received at closing; (3) a survey of the property showing the flood
plain; and (4) the knowledge imparted to CAP by the execution of two loan
documents relating to flood zone determination and hazards. 224 Based on that
information, the court held that CAP had sufficient notice to cause a reasonable
person to inquire further and, therefore, the two year limitation period began to
run at the date of the original closing, not at the subsequent date when a second
appraisal obtained by CAP indicated the flood plain. 225
B. BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY; ATTORNEY’S FEES
Howard Industries v. Crown Court & Seal Co. addressed whether attorney’s fees
were applicable to a breach of implied warranty claim. 226 Crown bought an
industrial transformer for its facility. 227 When the transformer failed, Crown
sued the manufacturer, installer, and various distributors for breach of an
implied warranty of merchantability. 228 The sole issue was whether attorney’s
fees are applicable to a breach of implied warranty claim. 229 The court cited the
general rule that attorney’s fees may be awarded only if authorized by statute or
contract. 230 Here, the breach occurred under the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) provision warranting that goods shall be merchantable if implied in a
sales contract where the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind. 231 The UCC, as a statutory enactment, does not authorize attorney’s fees;
therefore, the court had to determine whether the Texas Civil Practices and
Remedies Code allows for attorney’s fees if the claim is based on an oral or
written contract. 232 In analyzing this issue, the court looked at three prior Texas
Supreme Court cases, concluding that the damages plead generally dictate
whether the claim is based in contract (with attorney’s fees) or in tort (without
attorney’s fees). 233 The UCC breach of an express warranty claim here was a suit
on a contract; consequently, when the pleadings alleged pure economic
222. Id. at 215.
223. Id. at 215–16.
224. Id. at 217–18.
225. Id. at 219.
226. Howard Indus. v. Crown Court & Seal Co., 403 S.W.3d 347, 348 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 349.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 349, 351 (referring to TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(a) (West 2009)).
232. Id. at 349 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(8) (West 2008)).
233. Id. at 349–52 (citing Medical City Dallas, Ltd. v. Carlisle Corp., 251 S.W.3d 55 (Tex.
2008); 1/2 Price Checks Cashed v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 344 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2011) (a
dishonored check was held to be a suit on a contract); JCW Elecs., Inc. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701
(Tex. 2008)).
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damages, the claim sounded in contract, as opposed to claims alleging damages
for death or personal injury, which sound in tort. 234 This case is noteworthy to
the practitioner seeking attorney’s fees to be mindful that pleadings should only
allege economic damages to preserve the claims for attorney’s fees.
C. FRAUD AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Mavex Management v. Hines Dallas Hotel Ltd. involved the purchase of
unimproved property with the intention to develop a condominium project.235
Mavex acquired a one acre lot and a 10.37% interest in an adjacent parking tract
and parking deck with the intention to develop a multi-story, 126-unit
condominium tower in the Galleria area of Dallas. 236 The property was subject
to an existing Reciprocal Easement Agreement (REA) limiting the development
to a hotel. 237 The purchase and sale agreement was executed subject to the
obtainment of an amendment to the REA allowing the condominium
development. 238 Mavex prepared plans for the condominium unit and
submitted them to the city for site plan approval, as well as to the seller to
obtain various approvals from the owners of other property under the REA,
which included the Tower One Tract, Tower Two Tract, and the unimproved
property being acquired. 239 Mavex claimed that it relied upon representations in
the contract that the condominium could use 252 spaces in the parking garage
and 57 common use spaces for the condominium center after-hours events.240
However, at the time of closing, the owners of Tower One Tract and Tower Two
Tract had made no written assurances regarding the parking spaces. 241 While the
Tower One owner ultimately approved the plans, the Tower Two owner (who
was the transferee from the original owner) refused to accept the plans. 242 Mavex
sued Hines on fraud and promissory estoppel arguments, but the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Hines. 243
The appellate court noted that the evidence submitted by Mavex, constituting
primarily an affidavit of its principal, was merely conclusory in nature, not
having identified with any specificity when the alleged statements were made or
what specific actions Mavex took in reliance on the statements; therefore, the
affidavit did not raise fact issue sufficient to defeat the summary judgment. 244
Also, Mavex failed to introduce any proof that statements made by Hines were
false at the time they were made, which also did not support an attack on the
summary judgment in favor of Hines. 245 While the law in this case is not
234. Id. at 352.
235. Mavex Mgmt. Corp. v. Hines Dallas Hotel Ltd. P’ship, 379 S.W.3d 456, 458 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2012, no pet.).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 459.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 459–60.
244. Id. at 461.
245. Id. at 461–62.
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particularly noteworthy, this case demonstrates the problems encountered when
important title and development issues are not fully negotiated and documented
prior to a closing.
D. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
A long arm jurisdictional issue is presented in Tabacinic v. Frazier.246
Tabacinic, through a partnership entity, sold Frazier a house for $1,500,000
with a separate punch list agreement detailing the construction items to be
completed. 247 When the work was not completed and mechanic’s liens surfaced
against the property, Frazier sued Tabacinic, a resident of Florida.248 Tabacinic
challenged the jurisdiction of the court, but the appellate court held there were
sufficient contacts to assert specific jurisdiction over Tabacinic, noting Texas
courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants pursuant
to its long arm statute.249 Furthermore, such jurisdiction is allowed under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution if
“the nonresident has established minimum contacts with the forum state and
the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” 250 The facts in this case showed that Tabacinic individually
invested in multiple properties in Dallas, was the individual responsible for
making all decisions concerning actions of the various corporate entities, and
signed the purchase and sale agreement and punch list agreement by his
individual name without indicating any corporate capacity. 251 Consequently, the
court concluded that Frazier established sufficient evidence to assert special
jurisdiction over Tabacinic. 252 The Tabacinic defense of representative capacity
was deemed insufficient due to the actions noted above taken in a nonrepresentative capacity. 253
Tabacinic also alleged that a single contract would be insufficient for special
jurisdiction; the court disagreed, noting that contracts for the purchase or sale of
Texas property are types of contract that can show a purposeful availment of the
benefits of the forum jurisdiction. 254 By its very nature, a real estate contract
typically involves many contacts over a long period of time, implying various
continuing obligations and leaving no doubt of the continuing relationship with
Texas. 255 The court concluded that “the manner in which [Tabacinic] signed the
contract, coupled with the nature of the contract itself [being a contract covering
246. Tabacinic v. Frazier, 372 S.W.3d 658, 662 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet).
247. Id. at 665.
248. Id. at 662.
249. Id. at 662–63. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041–.045 (West 2008)
(the Texas long arm statute)).
250. Id. at 663 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72, 105 S. Ct. 2174,
85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed.
95 (1945)).
251. Id. at 665.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 666.
254. Id. at 666–68.
255. Id. at 667 (citing Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex.
2005)).
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Texas real property], constitute[d] sufficient[] purposeful contacts to support the
exercise of [specific] jurisdiction.” 256 Further, the court found that the fiduciary
shield doctrine used in tort cases would be inapplicable in this case because an
individual committed the alleged tortious actions. 257 Finally, the court decided
that the assertion of jurisdiction over Tabacinic did not violate the fair play and
substantial justice requirements, noting that litigation in Texas would not be
unfair or unjust despite the geographical distance, that the property
owner/purchaser had a significant interest in seeking convenient relief, and that
Texas had strong interest in adjudicating disputes concerning real property
within its borders. 258 This case brings home the importance that nonresident
parties carefully document simple representative capacity acts (such as signing) to
avoid special jurisdiction in Texas.
E. FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT DAMAGES; AS IS CLAUSES
Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P. contains a good discussion of damages
relating to a fraudulent inducement in the sale of commercial real property. 259
Fazio entered into a purchase agreement with Cypress to acquire a retail site,
which had as its primary tenant Garden Ridge Pottery.260 During the letter of
intent stage, Fazio asked for all information in the possession of Cypress
concerning the property. 261 At this time, Garden Ridge was in financial distress,
which Cypress knew.262 Garden Ridge had written to Cypress indicating it was
undergoing a corporate restructure and requested a thirty percent rent
reduction. 263 Cypress’s lender had also expressed concern about the financial
viability of Garden Ridge, even requiring an additional personal guaranty from
Cypress’s chief executive officer. 264 On the other hand, Fazio had undertaken its
own independent investigation of Garden Ridge, which included reviewing the
lease terms and Garden Ridge’s audited financial statements, and contacting
Garden Ridge’s chief financial officer for an assessment of its financial
condition (who advised Fazio of the restructuring and financial issues facing
Garden Ridge). 265 After such investigations, Fazio executed a purchase
agreement with Cypress, which contained a fairly typical “as is” clause. 266 Within
a few months, Garden Ridge had defaulted, declared bankruptcy, and rejected
its lease. 267 Fazio could not lease the space and sold the property within three
years for approximately fifty percent of the original sales price and sued Cypress
for fraudulent inducement for failing to disclose the financial condition of
256. Id. at 668.
257. Id. at 668–69.
258. Id. at 671.
259. Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., 403 S.W.3d 390, 394–97 (Tex. App—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).
260. Id. at 392–93.
261. Id. at 393.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 393, 406.
267. Id. at 393.
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Garden Ridge. 268 The trial court submitted two damage questions to the jury,
one of which was legally inapplicable. 269 The appellate court noted that there
were “two appropriate measures of direct damages in a fraud case: out-of-pocket
and benefit-of-the-bargain” damages, both of which are measured at the time of
the sale induced by the fraud. 270 Therefore, the jury instruction on damages that
asked for the difference between the price Fazio paid for the property and the
value of the property at the time of acquisition was a proper measure of out of
pocket damages. 271 The noteworthy aspects of this case, however, lie in the
concurring and dissenting opinions.
The concurring opinion is written in response to the dissent, which focused
on the disclaimer of reliance. 272 The concurring opinion noted that the
purchase and sale agreement was a fully integrated written agreement that
recited that the buyer would “rely solely upon its own investigation with respect
to the Property, including, without limitation, the Property’s . . . economic
condition”; that clearly and unequivocally disclaimed the buyer’s reliance on the
seller’s representations and omissions with respect to the property’s economic
condition; and that clearly and unequivocally disclaimed the seller’s liability
with respect to seller’s representations and omissions. 273 The initial letter of
intent was “displaced by and replaced with the terms of the Purchase
Agreement,” such that the letter of intent was merely a proposal and not
binding upon the parties until a formal purchase agreement was executed. 274
Numerous provisions in the letter of intent supported this conclusion.275
Further, the concurring opinion noted the existence of a “merger clause,” which
indicated that the initial purchase and sale agreement was the entire agreement
of the parties and not one of multiple agreements (including the letter of intent)
addressing the transaction. 276 The result of the merger clause was to override the
letter of intent’s due diligence provisions and adopt the detailed inspection
provisions contained in the purchase and sale agreement. 277 The concurring
opinion also addressed the disclaimer provision, concluding it was a clear and
unequivocal disclaimer of the borrower’s reliance on the completeness of the
documentation provided by seller. 278 The disclaimer provision was sufficient to
limit the scope of the seller’s obligations to search for and investigate
268. Id.
269. Id. at 394–95. The inapplicable question asked the difference between the price Fazio paid
for the property and the amount they received when sold. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 395.
272. Id. at 399 (Massengale, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 399.
274. Id. at 400.
275. Id. at 401 (noting that the letter of intent contained the following concepts: (i) the letter of
intent was an indication of negotiating for a purchase agreement; (ii) the escrow deposit was only
applicable upon an execution of a formal purchase agreement, and would be increased and become
nonrefundable upon removal of contingencies in the purchase agreement; (iii) the letter of intent
allowed Fazio in his sole judgment to determine whether to proceed with the purchase; and (iv) the
language that the letter of intent was an “expression of understanding and intention only” and
would not be binding until a formal purchase agreement was executed.).
276. Id. at 402 (citing the entire merger clause).
277. Id. at 402–03.
278. Fazio, 403 S.W.3d at 403–04 (quoting the entire reliance clause).
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documents, although it did not affirmatively authorize the seller to misrepresent
the truth or to knowingly conceal information. 279 However, the same provision
continued with an expressed disclaimer and waiver of any and all liabilities for
representations and warranties in or omissions from the various documents and
communications. 280 The existence of an “as is” provision was also viewed as
further evidence that the buyer intended to rely solely on its own
investigation. 281
Additionally, the concurring opinion discussed recent cases on disclaimer
provisions, such as Italian Cowboy, 282 which did not contain a “clear and
unequivocal” disclaimer because of “the absence of a disclaimer of reliance” and
was distinguished from Fazio’s merger provision (based on use of the term “rely”
and the waiver of “liability” in the disclaimer and “as is” provisions).283 Italian
Cowboy is in contrast to the other Texas Supreme Court cases of Schlumberger 284
and Forest Oil. 285 Each of those cases had an effective disclaimer of reliance with
language that was clear and unequivocal in expressly disclaiming reliance on
representations and affirming reliance on one’s own judgment. 286 The
provisions in the “as is” clause in Fazio were similar to the approved disclaimer
provisions in Schlumberger and Forest Oil in that the buyer agreed to rely solely
upon its own investigation and waived any and all liabilities arising from such
representations. 287 However, the concurring opinion did not discuss the five
prong test established by the Texas Supreme Court in Italian Cowboy, which is:
(1) whether the contract terms were negotiated or boiler plate; (2) whether the
complaining party was represented by counsel; (3) whether the parties dealt with
each other at arm’s length; (4) whether the parties were knowledgeable in
business matters; and (5) whether the release language was clear. 288 In this case,
Fazio was a sophisticated real estate investor (factor 4 above), the release and
waiver language was clear and unambiguous (factor 5 above), Fazio was able to
negotiate changes (factor 1 above), and Fazio had the resources to engage
counsel but voluntarily chose to forego such assistance (factor 2 above);
therefore, the concurring opinion concluded that the Italian Cowboy’s factors, as
well as the magnitude of the loan, were sufficient to give effect to the clear
disclaimer language of the contract. 289
In the lengthy, detailed, vigorous, and authoritative dissent, Justice Evelyn
Keyes took issue with the damages, apportionment of liability, exemplary
damages, and the basic fraudulent inducement claims; however, it is the

279. Id. at 404–09.
280. Id. at 404.
281. Id. at 406 (quoting the “as is” clause).
282. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 341 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 2011); see also
J. Richard White & G. Roland Love, Real Property, 66 SMU L. REV. 1081, 1101–08 (2013)
(detailed discussion of Italian Cowboy Partners).
283. Fazio, 403 S.W.3d at 406–09.
284. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 179–80 (Tex. 1997).
285. See Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 62 (Tex. 2008).
286. Fazio, 403 S.W.3d at 407.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 407–08.
289. Id. at 408–09.
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dissent’s focus on the fraudulent inducement claim that is noteworthy. 290 The
crux of the dissent’s argument is two-fold. First, the fraudulent inducement
occurred at the letter-of-intent stage, which caused the execution of the purchase
and sale agreement, and second, the “as is” disclaimer and merger clauses are
not clear and unequivocal waivers as to financial matters rather than property
conditions. 291
The dissent argued that the fraud in the inducement occurred during the
letter of intent stage and that the law is well established that a disclaimer of
reliance does not waive fraud in the inducement. 292 Cypress’s withholding of
vital information concerning Garden Ridge’s financial conditions occurred
during the letter of intent stage, during which Fazio had requested every piece of
information held by Cypress. 293 The dissent analyzed the exact language in the
purchase and sale agreement. 294 Disclosure requirements of the purchase and
sale agreement were contained in Section 5.2, entitled “Document Review,”
which related to the “truth, accuracy or completeness of the [d]ocuments” and
waived liabilities for “representations or warranties . . . and other matters
contained in the [d]ocuments.” 295 These documents included the lease, survey,
plans, architectural and engineering reports, service contracts, and permits, all of
which the dissent characterized as being property due diligence items and
distinguished from the economic condition of the tenant and property, which
were covered in the letter of intent.296 Therefore, the language was not clear and
unequivocal as to waive Cypress’s duty to disclose economic information as
opposed to the property condition information.297 Similarly, the dissent
reviewed the “as is” clause and found its terminology related solely to acceptance
of the property and its physical and environmental conditions. 298 Then, as to the
merger clause, the dissent concluded it could not reasonably be interpreted to
waive a fraudulent inducement claim.299 Consequently, the dissent concluded
that there was not clear and unequivocal language disclaiming reliance on
representations under the disclaimer, “as is,” and merger clauses that would
effectively waive a fraudulent inducement claim based on the concealment by
Cypress of relevant economic information concerning the tenant Garden
Ridge. 300
Based on its analysis of the narrowly construed disclaimer, “as is,” and merger
clauses, the dissent addressed whether there was a duty to disclose that was a
condition precedent. 301 A duty to disclose was applicable under Texas law in a
number of instances, such as when a partial disclosure conveys a false
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 412–32 (Keyes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 417–22.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 417–19.
Id. at 420–22.
Id. at 420 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 420–22.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 417.

2014]

Real Property

129

impression, as noted by the dissent, citing Bradford and JSC Neftegas-Impex.302
Based on this analysis, the dissent concluded that Cypress had a common law
and contractual duty to provide the economic information it concealed.303
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions reflect the continuing
problems courts have in fraudulent inducement cases with the interpretation of
(and practitioners have in drafting) the disclaimer, “as is,” and merger clauses.
These authors have reported on numerous other similar cases in prior years’
review.304 Clear, concise, and detailed provisions on the nature and scope of
such clauses will hopefully provide the practitioner with the intended results.
VI. LEASES; LANDLORD/TENANT
The courts also revisited the Italian Cowboy decision in a leasing context in
Dragon Fish, LLC v. Santikos Legacy, Ltd. and found the following clause sufficient
to disclaim reliance:
Reliance. LANDLORD AND TENANT HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT THEY ARE NOT RELYING UPON ANY BROCHURE,
RENDERING, INFORMATION, REPRESENTATION OR PROMISE
OF THE OTHER, OR AN AGENT OR BROKER, IF ANY, EXCEPT AS
MAY BE EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN THIS LEASE. 305
As in Fazio, the court conducted an extensive analysis of the Schlumberger and
Forest Oil decisions, together with Italian Cowboy, and found the disclaimer
language here was sufficient, clear, and unequivocal.306 Particularly in this case,
the parties negotiated the terms of the contract; the tenants were represented by
counsel; the parties dealt with each other at arm’s length; and the parties were
knowledgeable in business matters. 307 And, again, the disclaimer language was
clear. 308 Accordingly, a claim for fraudulent inducement did not lie. 309
A guaranty also existed where the guarantor guaranteed “the ‘payment and
performance of all liabilities, obligations and duties’ ‘imposed upon Tenant
under the terms of the Lease as if Guarantor had executed the Lease as Tenant
thereunder.’” 310 With this clause in place, the guarantor was bound by the
provisions in the lease, as those terms were incorporated into the guaranty.311
Similarly, in Futerfas Family Partners v. Griffin, it was a fact question as to whether
a change to a lease was a material alteration injuring or enhancing the risk of

302. Id. at 416 (citing Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. 2001); JSC Neftegas-Impex
v. Citibank, N.A., 635 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied)).
303. Id. at 417.
304. See White, supra note 282, at 1098–1101; J. Richard White & G. Roland Love, Real
Property, 61 SMU L. REV. 1073, 1088–92 (2008).
305. Dragon Fish, LLC v. Santikos Legacy, Ltd., 383 S.W.3d 175, 179–85 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2012, no pet.) (opinion withdrawn).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 184–85.
308. Id. at 185.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 187.
311. Id.
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injury to a guarantor, thereby releasing the guarantor.312
Ashford Partners, Ltd. v. Eco Resources, Inc. reminds us that an assignee of the
owner takes on the obligations of the landlord, which in this case included
construction and finish out of an interior space. 313 Also of interest, the measure
of damages was the difference between the agreed rental and the reasonable
cash-market value of the leasehold, not the cost of remedying the defects. 314 The
cost of property repair would not compensate the lessee for the difference
between the condition of the lease premises as promised and the actual value—
that is, the benefit of the bargain. 315
A number of the cases provided guidance in drafting. In Parkway Dental
Associates, P.A. v. Ho & Huang Properties, L.P., an original landlord-developer had
agreed with a tenant to not allow a competing dental operation in the shopping
center. 316 A portion of the property was then sold, and a new tenant leased space
inside the premises now owned by another. 317 The sale documents, deed, and
new lease had no competing tenant clause, and the new tenant started a dental
operation. 318 The earlier tenant could not prevent this business because no
prohibition existed in the new lease. 319 Thus, the original landlord may have
been in violation of and in breach of its original lease agreement, but the new
partial owner and tenant were not. 320 The lesson learned is that counsel should
take care to review existing leases and non-compete provisions in connection
with the sale of a portion of a larger property. Thorough drafting could have
prevented this problem.
Another decision by the Austin Court of Appeals is of interest because of its
discussion of the Texas Uniform Unincorporated Non-Profit Association Act
(TUUNAA), which rarely shows up in the case law.321 In M.T. Falcon Investments,
LLC v. Chisolm Trail Elks Lodge, an association had taken steps to comply with
TUUNAA. 322 The court found that such an association was a distinct entity,
with the members and agents not liable for the association’s actions. 323 A
landlord who rented commercial space to the association formed under
TUUNAA could not seek damages for breach of a lease agreement against the
individuals.324 This case clearly demonstrates the value of TUUNAA to clubs,
loose associations, and other similar groups.
312. Futerfas Family Partners v. Griffin, 374 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no
pet.).
313. Ashford Partners, Ltd. v. Eco Res., Inc., 379 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010), rev’d, 401 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. 2012).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Parkway Dental Assocs., P.A. v. Ho & Huang, L.P., 391 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 601–07.
321. See M.T. Falcon Invs., LLC v. Chisholm Trail Elks Lodge, 400 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2013, pet. denied).
322. Id. at 659–60.
323. Id. at 667.
324. Id.
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A number of cases dealt with forcible detainer actions. In Fontaine v. Deutsch
Bank National Trust Co., the foreclosure purchaser challenged an existing
tenant’s rights under the Protecting Tenants from Foreclosure Act of 2009
(PTFA).325 The only available precedent, which was non-binding, indicated that
a foreclosure purchaser carried the burden to demonstrate that a lease was not
bona fide. 326 This federal act was passed during the recession to protect tenants
and provide at least a ninety-day notice for termination of certain leases in the
event of a foreclosure, if the leases were indeed bona fide. 327 Tenants have
utilized the PTFA to protect their possession of property many times since its
enactment. 328 However, parties should remember that this act, found at 12
U.S.C. § 5220, sunseted on December 13, 2014.329
Several cases also revisited the jurisdictional question for a Justice Court—
always a headache for the courts. The Justice Court has authority to determine
right of possession but does not have jurisdiction to determine title. 330 As simple
as that may seem, the issues are often intertwined and difficult to determine.
In Pina v. Pina, the Justice Court did not have jurisdiction because there was a
title dispute between family members and the right of possession could not be
determined without resolution of that title question. 331 There was a deed from
the now deceased mother to the sisters, which the sons contended was obtained
by fraud. 332 With a somewhat contrary approach, the Court of Appeals in Dallas
in Lugo v. Ross confirmed the right to determine possession, even though the
tenants argued that they had an option agreement that permitted them to obtain
title.333 The tenants had attempted to exercise the purchase option but there was
a dispute over that exercise. 334 No closing had taken place.335 The court found
that such a claim had to be decided in a separate court with jurisdiction, but at
the present time, there was no title dispute to be resolved, and the owner was
entitled to his eviction. 336
In another case, which highlights a developing defense and one for which we
can only hope the courts exercise restraint, the party in possession raised a claim
of adverse possession. 337 The court found that “the county court, in considering
the pleadings before it, would have had to determine title to the property in
order to determine whether the [Plaintiff] had a superior right to possession.” 338
325. Fontaine v. Deutsch Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 372 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,
pet. dism’d).
326. Id. at 261.
327. Carsten Grellmann, Comment, Why State Courts May Prove Most Effective at Allowing the
Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act to Protect Tenants, 20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 295, 298–99 (2012).
328. Id. at 305.
329. Id. at 300.
330. Pina v. Pina, 371 S.W.3d 361, 365 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
331. Id. at 365–66.
332. Id. at 363.
333. See Lugo v. Ross, 378 S.W.3d 620, 620–26 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
334. Id. at 621.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 623–25.
337. See Bynum v. Lewis, 393 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, no pet.).
338. Id.
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The concern here of course is that any tenant might assert adverse possession as
a defense thereby taking jurisdiction away from the Justice Court. 339 Hopefully,
the courts will review the circumstances and limit the application, particularly if
there is or was a lease in place and the party was clearly initially in possession as
a tenant.
VII. CONSTRUCTION MATTERS
The survey period included a number of construction cases, most of which
are limited to their facts or procedures, but there were a few warranting
attention. First, in Jewelry Manufacturer’s Exchange, Inc. v. Tafoya, an original
subcontractor was not entitled to fund trap dollars to be paid to a new
subcontractor hired to replace that original subcontractor when it stopped
work. 340 Under the facts of this case, Tafoya was an electrical subcontractor that
stopped work at about 80% of completion. 341 The general contractor hired a
replacement contractor who completed the work. 342 Tafoya sought to fund trap
against payments being paid to the new contractor. 343 However, the court found
that the original contractor was not authorized to withhold funds from the
replacement contractor who had no relationship to the contractor it had
replaced. 344
The Dallas Court of Appeals also somewhat eroded the Certificate of Merit
Statute by prohibiting a construction defect case for negligence but allowing it as
a breach of contract, even in the absence of a certificate of merit. 345 In JJW
Development, LLC v. Strand Systems Engineering, Inc., the court found that Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 150.002, in effect in 2008, required a
certificate of merit to bring a claim based on professional services.346 This case
involved the design of a concrete foundation. 347 The court limited the affidavit
requirement to claims for negligence and not for contract, noting that an action
in contract is for the breach of an either expressed or implied duty arising under
the contract, while an action in tort is for the breach of a duty imposed by
law. 348 A contractual relationship can create duties under both contract law and
tort law. 349 However, in such a case, “the nature of the injury most often
determines which duty or duties are breached. When the injury is only the
economic loss to the subject of the contract itself, the action sounds in contract
alone.” 350 In this case, the allegations were not that the services were performed
339. See generally id. at 919–20.
340. Jewelry Mfgs. Exch., Inc. v. Tafoya, 374 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet.
denied).
341. Id. at 640–41.
342. Id. at 641.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 643.
345. See JJW Dev. LLC v. Strand Sys. Eng’g, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet.
denied).
346. Id. at 578.
347. Id. at 573–74.
348. Id. at 579.
349. Id.
350. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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improperly, but that they were not performed at all as required by the
contract. 351 Moreover, repair costs and diminution in value were determined to
be the benefit-of-the-bargain or economic-loss damages, 352 indicating a breach of
contract. The court found that a certificate of merit was not required for a claim
for tortious interference. 353
A similar analysis can be found in Retherford v. Castro, dealing with the
professional services exception under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA). 354 This case is important in that it finds that a professional home
inspector licensed by the Texas Real Estate Commission is a professional
excepted from liability under the DTPA. 355 Thus, no DTPA claim can be
brought against the individual because the essence of the service was providing
advice, judgment, or opinion based on specialized knowledge or training. 356 The
professional real estate inspector was not exempted under the above referenced
Certificate of Merit Statute but did qualify under § 17.49(c) of the DTPA. 357
However, the exemption was not available for a negligent misrepresentation
claim, which the court remanded for further consideration. 358
Two more cases also dealt with subcontractors. In Yost v. Jered Custom Homes,
a homeowner who had suffered a loss of the home due to foreclosure still had
standing to assert claims against the builder for negligence and breach of
implied warranties of habitability and of good and workmanlike construction.359
The homeowner may have been harmed by a reduction in the home’s sale price
at foreclosure. 360
Also, in Courtland Building Company, Inc. v. Jalal Family Partnership, Ltd., a
contractor had a right to compel arbitration to resolve a dispute involving a
subcontractor’s performance and property owned by a partnership, even though
not all of the partners had executed the building contract that included the
arbitration clause. 361 The court applied a doctrine of “direct benefits estoppel”
to compel arbitration because the non-signatory party sought to derive a direct
benefit from the contract that contained the arbitration clause. 362

351. Id. at 580.
352. Id. at 581.
353. See Jay Miller & Sundown, Inc. v. Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc., 381 S.W.3d 635, 643–
44 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.).
354. Retherford v. Castro, 378 S.W.3d 29, 32–37 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied).
355. Id. at 31.
356. Id. at 36–37.
357. Id. at 35.
358. Id. at 37–38.
359. Yost v. Jered Custom Homes, 399 S.W.3d 653, 658–59 (Tex. App.—App. Dallas 2013, no
pet.).
360. Id. at 658.
361. Courtland Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Jalal Family P’ship Ltd., 403 S.W.3d 265, 271 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
362. Id.
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VIII. TITLE MATTERS
A. ADVERSE POSSESSION/TITLE DISPUTES
In a case that dealt with the area of public roads and implied dedication, the
El Paso Court of Appeals found that a dirt road that ran through the property
had been impliedly dedicated for public use.363 In McCulloch v. Brewster County,
the dispute originated when the county designated Mills Road as a county road
on its county road map. 364 The plaintiffs timely filed a challenge to that
designation within the statutorily required two year period. 365 In particular, the
plaintiffs sought a Declaratory Judgment that Mills Road was a private road.366
Implied dedication involves the landowner causing the public to believe that he
planned to dedicate the road to public use; that he was legally capable to
dedicate it; that the public acted upon that belief and will benefit from the
dedication; and that the landowner offered and the public accepted the
dedication. 367 Permitting a governmental authority “to grade, repair, improve, or
fence off the roadway” may establish donative intent, but even a “long and
continued use of the disputed road by the public raises a presumption of
dedication.” 368 In this case, older maps showed the road, and the county had
maintained the road. Of particular interest in this case is that the origin of the
road was “shrouded in obscurity” and there was evidence of “long and
continued use of the road by the public.” 369 This created a presumption that the
land owner intended to dedicate the road to the public. 370
In one adverse possession case worthy of note, Blaylock v. Holland, the Texas
courts’ general disregard for fences did not play out. 371 The construction of a
chain link fence began the running of limitations, but suit was filed just prior to
the ten year period. 372 Earlier activity when the fence did not exist was
insufficient to create notice of an assertion of a hostile claim to the property. 373
Also, the question of trespass-to-title-versus-declaratory-judgment causes of
action continues to be an issue for the courts. A declaratory judgment action is
often more attractive to a plaintiff because it provides a basis to obtain attorney’s
fees. 374 Trespass to try title does not permit recovery of attorney’s fees, as has
been discussed in previous survey issues, although there are limited
circumstances permitting it under the adverse possession statutes involving a
dispossession. 375 In Richmond v. T.N. Wells, a declaratory judgment action was

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

McCulloch v. Brewster County, 391 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.).
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 616.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 618.
See Blaylock v. Holland, 396 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
Id. at 722–23.
Id. at 723.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009 (West 2008).
J. Richard White & G. Roland Love, Real Property, 61 SMU L. REV. 1073, 1103 (2008).
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appropriate to interpret a deed. 376 The court further noted that “generally, nonpossessory interests are not proper subjects for a trespass-to-try-title action.”377
Moreover, the court touched on the question of actual notice by possession
since, in this case, there was a lack of constructive notice, and it found that the
existence of a pump jack did not put a grantee on notice of any interest claimed
by a third party. 378
Vernon v. Perrien is another instance where the court distinguishes the
declaratory judgment from a trespass-to-try-title action by noting that a trespassto-try-title action is statutory and relies on the superior title of the plaintiff. 379 “A
suit to quiet title relies on the invalidity of the defendant’s claim to the
property,” the effect of which is to declare invalid or ineffective a defendant’s
claim to title. 380
In Wilhoite v. Sims, the court of appeals found a declaratory judgment action
appropriate to cancel a deed that was voidable as opposed to requiring a trespassto-try-title action. 381 “A suit for cancellation of a deed [was] an assertion of an
equitable title” and was “not a claim of right to title and possession of [the] real
property.” 382 In this case, during the pendency of a divorce, the wife had
attempted to transfer by quitclaim her one-half interest in the property. 383
Finally, in the category of “no good deed goes unpunished,” a property owner
that had maintained a small family cemetery that was not his family’s was
precluded from arguing that the cemetery was an “abandoned cemetery” under
Health and Safety Code § 711.010(b). 384 This prevented the property owner
from relocating the cemetery to assist with oil and gas operations and from
seeking removal (or permitting exhumation) to transfer the human remains to a
perpetual cemetery. 385
B. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
Several cases dealt with legal descriptions, including compliance with the
Statute of Frauds. In one case, an appellate court considered the issue of a road
dedicated to public use that stated it was one hundred feet wide but also
provided that the dedication was subject to the condition that the curb line on
the road would be fifteen feet inside the street line. 386 In effect, this limited the
roadway to seventy feet. 387 At the same time, the dedication as a roadway did not
state an easement for other than roadway purposes, and the thirty-foot space was
376. Richmond v. T. N. Wells, 395 S.W.3d 262, 267 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 268.
379. Vernon v. Perrien, 390 S.W.3d 47, 61 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied).
380. Id.
381. Wilhoite v. Sims, 401 S.W.3d 752, 760 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
382. Id. at 756.
383. Id.
384. Levandovsky v. Targa Res., Inc., 375 S.W.3d 593, 597–98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
385. Id.
386. State v. NICO—WF1, LLC, 385 S.W.3d 45, 48 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010), rev’d,
State v. NICO—WF1, LLC, 384 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. 2012).
387. Id.
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not available for use, even for the public benefit, when it was inconsistent with
the dedication. 388 The Supreme Court of Texas in reversed the decision in State
v. NICO—WF1, LLC. 389 The court found that the dedication of an easement as a
public right of way could not carry private restrictions that impaired the state’s
control and public use of the dedicated street. 390 A dedication of land for public
use may include reasonable restrictions and limitations, but those limitations
cannot be repugnant to the dedication or against public policy. 391 Rather than
declare the entire grant as ineffective, the court sustained the dedication and
found the condition ineffective. 392 In this case, then, a building that encroached
several feet into the 100-foot right of way could be removed by the state. 393 For
those seeking to expand their vocabulary, the encroachment was a “purpresture”
or “an appropriation to private use to that which belongs to the public.” 394
In El Dorado Land Company, L.P. v. City of McKinney, a property conveyed to
the city included a reversionary interest in the event that the land was used for
anything other than a community park. 395 When the city violated the restriction,
statutory immunity included an inability to force the city to re-grant. 396 The
court treated the reverter as a conditional future interest.397 Thus, while the
dedicating grantor could not cause a reverter, it did have a right to seek
compensation for the inverse condemnation. 398
The Court of Appeals for El Paso took a somewhat similar approach in Singer
v. State. 399 Two donation deeds to the State of Texas for public highway
purposes included a reverter clause in the event that the land was not used for
public highway purposes on or before January 1, 2000. 400 The grantors in this
case did take steps to assert inverse condemnation. 401 The state argued that the
language of the deeds created a condition subsequent, which, having been
satisfied, though late, could not result in the automatic reversion and revestment
of title. 402 A condition subsequent is language designating an event upon which
the grantor has the power to terminate the grantee’s interest. 403 The grantor
must take steps to reenter or take an equivalent action to terminate the grantee’s
estate. 404 “A possibility of reverter is ‘a future interest retained by a grantor after
conveying a fee simple determinable, so that the grantee’s estate terminates

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
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404.

Id. at 50–51.
State v. NICO—WF1, LLC, 384 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. 2012).
Id. at 824.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id. at 824 at n.2.
El Dorado Land Co., L.P. v. City of McKinney, 395 S.W.3d 798, 799–800 (Tex. 2013).
Id. at 801.
Id. at 800–01.
Id. at 804.
See Singer v. State, 391 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied).
Id. at 630.
Id. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 632 n.1.
Id. at 631–33.
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automatically and reverts to the grantor if the terminating event ever occurs.’”405
The court indicated that there were no specific words that controlled, but
rather, the key was the intent at the time of the grant. 406 Language such as
“while,” “during,” “until,” or “so long as” typically establish an intent to create a
fee simple determinable.407 Phrases such as “upon condition that,” “provided
that,” “but if,” or “if it happens that” create a condition subsequent.408 The
deeds in question, even though they utilize a reference to reversion, did not
specifically contain automatic reversion language. 409 Because the language in the
deeds was unclear as to whether it created a condition subsequent or a
possibility of reverter, any doubt was to be resolved in favor of a condition
subsequent.410 In addition, the deed used traditional fee simple absolute
language, including “grant, give and convey” and a habendum clause that used
the words, “to have and to hold the premises herein described and herein
conveyed unto the State of Texas and its assigns forever.” 411
As a condition subsequent, because some activity had already begun by
January 1, 2000, the court found that the grantors had failed to establish a right
to title.412 The grantors failed to timely reenter or take equivalent action to
terminate the state’s interest. 413 This case is a bit frightening in that it would
appear the grantors generally intended for the property to return to them if not
timely used for public highway purposes. The case demonstrates the effort to
which the courts will go to protect public interests and to avoid finding a
reverter. Any attorney drafting a deed to include a reverter, particularly when
dealing with a public entity, should go to great lengths to set out the reversion
and to make it clear that it is not a fee simple absolute and the grant is subject to
reverter, ipso facto, without requiring the grantor to take any further action.
In Ardmore, Inc. v. Rex Group, Inc., a description of the property that identified
three sides with the fourth side being a line on an attached map was sufficient to
describe the property. 414 This case was in a leasing context, but the court found
that there was no distinction between determining an adequate legal description
under deeds or a leasing instrument. 415 The map of a larger tract under lease was
attached as an exhibit in support of a purchase option. 416 However, note that in
May v. Buck, 100 acres centered on a point was an inadequate description. 417
Obviously, a 100-acre shape with a center point could be not only a circle, but
also a square or even an irregular shape with a center point. The use of acreage
to describe a legal description is rarely adequate because acreage is only a
405. Id. at 632 n.1.
406. Id. at 632 n.2.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 633.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 634.
413. Id.
414. Ardmore, Inc. v. Rex Grp., 377 S.W.3d 45, 59 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.
denied).
415. Id. at 55–60.
416. Id. at 51–52.
417. May v. Buck, 375 S.W.3d 568, 677 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
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measure of area.
In another case, Hahn v. Love, the court of appeals in Houston again
confirmed that the use of a tax ID number and a street address can be a
sufficient legal description for purposes of conveying real property. 418 This case
includes an interesting discussion of the judgment liens and their duration, and
of the renewal and dormancy of a judgment. 419 This is an area often confused,
and the court does an excellent job of separating a judgment, a writ of
execution, and a dormancy from the lien created by an abstract of judgment
under Texas Property Code Chapter 52. 420 No lien exists under a judgment
until it is abstracted, recorded, and indexed. 421 In this case, the judgment debtor
purchased property to which a judgment lien attached, but during the debtor’s
ownership, the judgment lien expired. 422 The judgment also became dormant
for failure to issue a new writ of execution within ten years of its initial
issuance. 423 When the application was filed to revive the judgment, a deed was
recorded before the judgment could be revived and a new judgment lien
abstracted. 424 However, subsequent to all of these events, a correction deed was
filed to deal with the possible inadequate legal description noted above. 425 The
judgment creditor argued that this was evidence that the first deed was void for
lack of an adequate legal description and that the correction deed put a
subsequent purchaser on notice of the second judgment lien. 426 The court
found that this was not the case, that the first deed was adequate, and that the
second judgment lien came too late. 427 Further, the court found that the
correction deed was outside the chain of title and did not excite inquiry. 428
Again, note that the court found that a subsequent correction deed in 2004
to add a proper legal description was not relevant since the earlier deed was
adequate and that it was outside the chain of title. 429 This last finding is subject
to some question since the statutory scheme for correction instruments indicates
that they do “replace and substitute” for the original deed. 430 It also highlights
some of the problems with current correction instrument legislation and
indexing by the county clerks, which remains an issue for real property records
and the county clerk’s filing systems. It may well require the legislature to fix
Texas Local Government Code §§ 193.003(a), (b) and 193.005.
More evidence of drafting lessons can be found in a number of 2012 Texas
cases. Similar to Hahn, an exception for a riverbed acreage was sufficient to

418. Hahn v. Love, 394 S.W.3d 14, 20, 26–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.
denied).
419. See id. at 27–28.
420. See id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 27.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 27–28.
428. Id. at 28.
429. Id. at 27–28.
430. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.030(b) (West Supp. 2013).
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except the property from a conveyance. 431 In Hunsaker v. Brown Distributing Co.,
the terminology “now owned by grantor” referred to the fractional interest
owned by the grantor so that the 1/2 conveyance resulted in the grantor
conveying 1/2 of his interest instead of his entire 1/4 interest. 432 Finally, Arco
Petroleum Corp. v. BNW Property Co. and Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. BNW
Property Co. demonstrated that an executive right follows a conveyance of
minerals unless expressly reserved. 433
Also worth mentioning, the Texarkana Court of Appeals in Champion v.
Robinson pointed out the presumption in favor of partitioning property in kind
as opposed to partitioning by sale. 434 The court further presumed that minerals
are equally distributed throughout a property unless there is a showing to the
contrary. 435 In this case, there were numerous property interests in irregular
sized properties and partition in kind was simply not appropriate. 436
C. EASEMENTS
The Eastland Court of Appeals provides a good discussion of various
easements in its decision in Harrington v. Dawson–Conway Ranch, Ltd. 437 The case
itself is a reversal of a summary judgment granted to the dominant estate to the
north. 438 The court reviewed, in particular, two theories of easements, by
prescription and by necessity. 439 The court disregarded the possibility of an
implied easement appurtenant because it was not pleaded. 440 To find an
easement by necessity, the key points were that the necessity had to be a strict
necessity, existing both at the time of severance and continuing at the present
date.441 Here, the dominant estate failed to prove that the necessity was
continuing. 442
The easement by prescription was also not available because the parties had
jointly used the road, and such a use could not ripen into an easement by
prescription. 443 The court spent significant time discussing the Scott v. Cannon
case, which created a very limited exception to the exclusivity requirement for
road usage. 444 It noted, specifically, that in Scott there was a dispute over a right
431. See Buckingham v. McAfee, 393 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. denied).
432. Hunsaker v. Brown Distrib. Co., 373 S.W.3d 153, 159 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012,
pet. denied).
433. Arco Petroleum Corp. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012,
pet. denied); Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied).
434. Champion v. Robinson, 392 S.W.3d 118, 125–26 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet.
denied).
435. Id. at 125.
436. Id.
437. Harrington v. Dawson–Conway Ranch, Ltd., 372 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012,
pet. denied).
438. Id. at 714, 726.
439. Id. at 716–26.
440. Id. at 722.
441. Id. at 722–23.
442. Id. at 724.
443. Id. at 722.
444. Id. at 717–18 (discussing Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet.

140

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 1

to use the road.445 The dominant estate had filed an affidavit claiming the road
as a public road, had maintained and improved the road, and had performed
other independent acts that were distinct and positive assertions of a right to use
the road. 446
The Eastland Court of Appeals again dealt with easements, this time with one
that was written. In McKenna v. Caldwell, the granting party had reserved an
easement “for purposes of providing a perpetual free, uninterrupted and
unobstructed easement for access, ingress and egress to and from [the
property].” 447 The fight was over the right to place a cattle guard and to install a
gate across the property line. 448 Because the language was ambiguous as to these
items, the court found a fact question for the jury. 449 Whether the language of
the easement allowed for a gate or cattle guard depended on the intent of the
parties.450 For attorneys drafting easements to be reserved or granted, the
Eastland Court directed attention to Knight v. Buckbrier, where easements were
found to be unambiguous. 451 The easements in that case “specifically stated no
barriers of any kind were to be erected, other than two gates already in existence,
that would interfere with the free flow of access.” 452 The court did note that
most cattle guards would not be considered an interruption or obstruction, yet
still returned the entire question back to the trial court for submission to the
jury. 453
D. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS, AND OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION
Two cases highlight the potential dilemma to a developer of real property that
seeks to retain the minerals. If the developer does not hold 100% of the
minerals but does hold the executive rights, it may well find itself in a fiduciary
quandry. The holder of the executive rights has a fiduciary duty to other mineral
interests to develop the minerals, while the developer may desire to protect the
real estate development from any oil and gas exploration and development,
often through the use of restrictive covenants.454 In Friddle v. Fisher, the existence
of this dilemma and the fiduciary duty created a fact question for the jury. 455
Likewise, the Ft. Worth Court of Appeals found a fact question as to breach of
duty in Bradshaw v. Steadfast Financial, LLC. 456 The Bradshaw case also involved
issues of self-dealing in connection with structuring bonus payments and
denied)).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. McKenna v. Caldwell, 387 S.W.3d 830, 832–33 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.).
448. Id. at 833.
449. Id. at 836.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 835 n.2 (citing Knight v. Buckbrier, No. 04-01-00539-CV, 2002 WL 1285292 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio June 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)).
452. Id.
453. Id. at 835.
454. See Friddle v. Fisher, 378 S.W.3d 475, 480–81 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. denied).
455. Id. at 428.
456. Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., LLC, 395 S.W.3d 348, 370 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2013, no
pet.).
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royalties.457
E. HOMESTEAD
There were not many case developments in the area of homestead during the
survey period, but one case out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Western
District of Texas should draw some attention. 458 In this case, the Chapter 7
trustee objected to the debtor’s homestead exemption, as did a judgment
creditor, because the judgment resulted from a violation of Texas securities laws
that was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). 459 The Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) caps a
“debtor’s homestead exemption for certain violations of federal or state
securities laws.” 460 The interesting aspect of this case arises because the debtor’s
non-filing spouse had her own business that provided income for the support of
the family. 461 The case spends much time talking about valuation and income
but the most interesting part is the court’s handling of the determination to sell
the homestead because it exceeded the BAPCPA cap. 462 The court declined to
allow the non-debtor spouse to assert a separate homestead exemption for the
homestead property. 463
Community property and jointly owned property are part of the bankruptcy
estate even if only one spouse files for bankruptcy. 464 However, the court
determined that the non-filing spouse does not have an independent interest in
the homestead so as to stack the caps. 465 On the other hand, had both husband
and wife filed as joint debtors they would have been entitled to claim a stacking
of the homestead exemptions. 466 Most troubling though, the court followed Kim
and indicated that not only could the non-debtor not claim an exemption but
that “[t]here is also no provision for compensation for the non-filing spouse’s
property interest.” 467 Not even the Internal Revenue Service in seeking to
enforce a federal tax lien against one spouse enjoys that benefit. 468
The court’s analysis would appear flawed in that it failed to give any respect to
the community property or homestead interest of the non-debtor spouse,
whether through handling sale proceeds or through allowing an exemption.
How would the court have determined the case if both spouses were debtors or
if the spouses were tenants in common? The court seems to reach a conclusion
that makes no difference whether the property was community or separate and,
again, gives a judgment creditor even more rights than the federal government
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would have in pursuing a federal tax lien.469
F. TITLE INSURANCE
Hahn v. Love, discussed previously regarding deeds and legal descriptions, also
includes a thorough discussion regarding title insurance examination and
imputed knowledge to the parties.470 This case involved claims of fraudulent
transfer, and the plaintiff sought to defeat the bona-fide-purchaser position
taken by the purchaser. 471 The court repeated the basic premise that the title
company searches for its own benefit in issuing a title insurance policy and has
no duty to examine title or disclose what it may or may not find. 472 Most
importantly, “an examination is not undertaken for the prospective grantee or
lienholder to whom the policy will finally issue,” and any information
discovered by the title company was not imputed to the purchaser. 473 The title
company had no duty to even disclose what it might find in its examination,
potentially adverse or not. 474
IX. MISCELLANEOUS
A. NUISANCE/TRESPASS
During the survey period a very good discussion of nuisance and trespass was
authored by the Tyler Court of Appeals in Mathis v. Barnes. 475 This case involved
flooding caused by a neighbor’s construction of a road. 476 The situation arose
from two adjoining rural properties with a creek running through them. 477 The
plaintiff was upstream and had sought to cultivate “pristine wetlands” on a
portion of his property. 478 The property was a “watering, nesting, and roosting
place for waterfowl” and had “only limited seasonal fluctuation” due to
“multiple beaver dams” and other natural effects. 479 The property downstream
was used mostly as pastureland, and the owner constructed a road across the
property “so that he could more easily access the back pasture.” 480 However, this
“road . . . effectively served as a dam where it crossed [the creek].” 481 This
dam/road caused water to rise upstream. 482 The downstream owner sought to
install culverts to address some of the problem, but, during a flood, the road
washed away and the water level on the upstream property significantly
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
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retreated. 483 In essence, the beavers and other natural circumstances had
adjusted to the road/dam, but the water was gone once the situation was out of
kilter.484 The upstream owner asserted a nuisance and trespass among other
claims. 485
The court noted that “[a] nuisance is a condition that substantially interferes
with the use and enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or
annoyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy it.” 486
A determination of the nuisance depends upon the “kind of damage done,
rather than any particular type of conduct.” 487 Of note, the downstream owner
raised the “feral hog defense,” among other things, and the jury found that the
flooding was not such that it was a nuisance. 488 There was also disputed
evidence as to whether the beavers would return to repair the dams to return the
property to its wetland condition. 489
With the respect to trespass, the court defined it as an “unauthorized entry
upon the land of another.” 490 Again, the jury agreed with the downstream owner
that no damage was done, even though a trespass may have occurred by reason
of the waters being forced back upstream. 491 Possibly the jury in this case was
not very sympathetic to the upstream owner and the case turns on its facts, but
the discussion of nuisance and trespass is useful. It also brings to life the “feral
hog defense.” 492
B. PREMISES LIABILITY
In the area of premises liability, the Houston Court of Appeals for the 14th
District rendered a very “tough” decision in yet another case that proves the old
adage of “no good deed goes unpunished.” In Plunket v. Nall, the homeowners
held a New Year’s Eve party. 493 The homeowners advised guests that anyone
remaining at midnight was to spend the entire night at the home. 494 This action
was to help ensure that “no party guest drove while intoxicated.” 495 Thus, the
homeowners took on a duty not otherwise imposed under Texas law. 496 The
homeowners took no steps to enforce the rule in that they did not retain car
keys or take any other action to prevent guests from leaving. 497 Of course, a

483. Id.
484. Id. at 929.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 930.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 931.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 930.
493. Plunket v. Nall, 374 S.W.3d 584, 585 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001), rev’d, 404
S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2013)).
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. See Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 918–22 (Tex. 1993).
497. Plunket, 374 S.W.3d at 585.
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guest and his girlfriend attempted to leave at 2 a.m. and an accident occurred. 498
Accordingly, while no social host liability might exist, a cause of action for
negligence for the assumed duty survived a motion for summary judgment. 499
In other cases dealing with premises liability, the San Antonio Court of
Appeals in Dietz v. Hill Country Restaurants, Inc. found no evidence that uneven
pebbles and concrete in an aggregate walkway posed an unreasonable risk of
harm or that the owner was on notice.500 In City of Dallas v. Prado, the Dallas
Court of Appeals found that liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act required
actual knowledge of a premises defect. 501 Moreover, in Dow Chemical Company v.
Abutahoun the court pointed out that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §
95.003 requires actual knowledge in the area of owner liability to a contractor’s
employees. 502
C. BROKERS
With respect to the Texas Finance Code § 156.406(b), commonly referred to
as the Broker Licensing Requirements, a lender/mortgagee did not have
standing as “an aggrieved person” to seek recovery against an unlicensed
broker.503 In order to be an “aggrieved person” with standing to assert a cause of
action under this section of the Finance Code, it is necessary that the person
directly paid the brokerage fee to the unlicensed broker. 504 In Dohalick v. Moody
National Bank, the bank advanced loan funds to a borrower who then used those
loan proceeds to pay the brokerage fee. 505 This was not a direct payment but
rather a payment by the borrower, even though it used loan proceeds to make
the payment. 506 Note also that in this case there were no lender instructions
requiring the use of the proceeds to make such a payment. 507
D. WATER RIGHTS
The Texas Supreme Court dealt with the interpretation and application of
the Open Beaches Act to easements for public beachfront access. 508 In Severance
v. Patterson, the case dealt with whether or not a “rolling” public beachfront
access easement existed under Texas law. 509 Along the Gulf Coast, there exist
two easements:
498. Id.
499. Id. at 588–89.
500. Dietz v. Hill Country Rests., Inc., 398 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no
pet.).
501. City of Dallas v. Prado, 373 S.W.3d, 848, 853 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.)
(discussing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021(2), 101.022(a) (West 2011)).
502. Dow Chemical Co. v. Abutahoun, 395 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet.
denied).
503. Dohalick v. Moody Nat’l Bank, 375 S.W.3d 537, 540–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
504. Id. at 541.
505. Id. at 539.
506. Id. at 543.
507. See id. at 544.
508. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 713 (Tex. 2012).
509. Id.
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(1) The first one extends from low tide to high tide. This is land that is
always public and reserved to the state. It is often referred to as a
“wet” beach.
(2) The second more difficult easement is the “dry” beach that extends
from high tide to the mean vegetation line. 510
This second easement only exists if retained by the state initially or if an
easement has been granted to the state by a private landowner. 511 In the case of
the west beach of Galveston Island, the state had not retained a dry beach
easement but had obtained certain easements from private interests. 512 As
boundaries along the ocean change due to slow erosion or accretion, the
easement may slightly move. 513 These changes are typically gradual and
imperceptible. 514 However, avulsive events such as storms and hurricanes can
drastically alter preexisting boundaries. 515 This was the case with Hurricane
Rita. 516
The question then arose as to whether or not the easement rolled forward
onto the beach due to significant changes in the high tide and vegetative line. 517
In this case, a rolling easement would have placed Ms. Severance’s home in the
public beach access easement and permitted the state to remove the home. 518
The Texas Supreme Court held that a public beachfront dry easement did not
roll forward, and the public accordingly lost any interest in the privately owned
dry beach. 519 In other words, the easement did not migrate or roll landward to
encumber other parts of the parcel as a result of an avulsive event. 520 Thus, while
the public has an important interest in the enjoyment of Texas public beaches,
the right to exclude others from privately owned realty is a fundamental right
possessed by private property owners.521 A taking of Ms. Severance’s property
would have resulted in a taking in violation of the 5th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 522 Note, however, the wet beach is always public property and
owners like Ms. Severance can lose improvements if the mean high tide line
captures it. 523 To the contrary, in the event of avulsive action, where the public
once had access across a “dry” beach public easement, there may now be no
public access.524 Thus, a public “wet” easement may, in realty, become a private
beach. 525
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Id. at 713–14.
Luttes v. State, 324 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1958).
Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 724.
Id. at 724–25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715.
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Id. at 725.
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X. CONCLUSION
As would be expected following an economic downturn, there were
significant numbers of cases addressing foreclosure issues; unfortunately, some
of these decisions were wrongly decided. Decisions regarding the standing of a
property owner to challenge the legal authority of assignees of the mortgage were
cogently addressed and confirmed in Homecomings Financial. 526 This concept,
while not directly addressed, was supported by the decision in Cowin. 527 On the
other hand, the Marsh decision, while adequately addressing the “robo signer”
issues regarding proof of authority to execute documentation, added to the
confusion on standing of a property owner to challenge mortgage assignments
by concluding just the opposite from Homecomings Financial. 528 Hopefully, future
case law will clarify this matter.
As is normally the case, a number of cases reflect the importance in careful
drafting of documentation. In Garcia, practitioners are warned to draft escrow
provisions to distinguish between the duty to obtain or renew insurance as
opposed to the mere payment of premiums therefor. 529 Clear documentation of
the representative capacity in which an individual signs was lacking in and
determinative of jurisdiction in Tabacinic. 530 The drafting and interpretation of
reliance provisions, “as-is” clauses, and merger clauses continue to prove thorny
for both the practitioner (in drafting) and the courts (in interpretation and
enforcement). Fazio presents an excellent analysis of such difficulties in the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. 531
While the courts revisited, defined, and clarified a number of areas, such as
FED jurisdiction, declaratory judgments, roads and easements, and water rights,
they also created confusion and concern in some other areas. Most of this was
motivated by protection of the state or the attempt to avoid what was perceived
as an inequitable result. The protective requirements of a certificate of merit and
other protections provided to professionals were somewhat eroded, and the
court stretched to turn reverters into conditions subsequent and sustain legal
descriptions. Also, concerns that may require legislative action arose in the areas
of homestead rights in bankruptcy and the use of correction deeds. Finally, land
use planners should also be very aware of the legal dilemma that may arise for
the developer seeking to avoid mineral exploration and development but who at
the same time holds the executive rights, which results in a fiduciary duty to
other mineral interests. 532

526. See Miller v. Homecomings Fin., 881 F. Supp. 2d 825 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
527. See In re Cowin, 492 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).
528. Compare id., with Miller, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
529. See Garcia v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 3:12-CV-0062-D, 2012 WL 692099, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 5, 2012).
530. See Tabacinic v. Frazier, 373 S.W.3d, 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
531. See Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., 403 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2013, pet. denied).
532. See Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., LLC, 395 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2013, no
pet.).

